Re: [Sidrops] draft-sidrops-rpkimaxlen

Matthias Waehlisch <m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de> Sun, 24 February 2019 13:50 UTC

Return-Path: <m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de>
X-Original-To: sidrops@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: sidrops@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5621B130E72; Sun, 24 Feb 2019 05:50:29 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.201
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id D5lGXbqRcbDl; Sun, 24 Feb 2019 05:50:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from outpost1.zedat.fu-berlin.de (outpost1.zedat.fu-berlin.de [130.133.4.66]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A811129532; Sun, 24 Feb 2019 05:50:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from inpost2.zedat.fu-berlin.de ([130.133.4.69]) by outpost.zedat.fu-berlin.de (Exim 4.85) with esmtps (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) (envelope-from <m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de>) id <1gxuAh-002706-6E>; Sun, 24 Feb 2019 14:50:23 +0100
Received: from x4dbf1952.dyn.telefonica.de ([77.191.25.82] helo=mw-x1.fritz.box) by inpost2.zedat.fu-berlin.de (Exim 4.85) with esmtpsa (TLSv1.2:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) (envelope-from <m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de>) id <1gxuAg-002zNa-Uf>; Sun, 24 Feb 2019 14:50:23 +0100
Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 14:50:21 +0100
From: Matthias Waehlisch <m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de>
To: "Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed)" <kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov>
cc: "sidrops@ietf.org" <sidrops@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <SN6PR0901MB23662F6907DD092EA0EC988184790@SN6PR0901MB2366.namprd09.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <alpine.WNT.2.00.1902241416230.4012@mw-x1>
References: <SN6PR0901MB236677B37676FFB11A22B14D84780@SN6PR0901MB2366.namprd09.prod.outlook.com>, <alpine.WNT.2.00.1902240047270.4012@mw-x1> <SN6PR0901MB23662F6907DD092EA0EC988184790@SN6PR0901MB2366.namprd09.prod.outlook.com>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.00 (WNT 1167 2008-08-23)
X-X-Sender: waehl@mail.zedat.fu-berlin.de
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-Originating-IP: 77.191.25.82
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/-S_C7uR5dHDHFRQX4RpGrtQgPbU>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] draft-sidrops-rpkimaxlen
X-BeenThere: sidrops@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: A list for the SIDR Operations WG <sidrops.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/sidrops>, <mailto:sidrops-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/sidrops/>
List-Post: <mailto:sidrops@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:sidrops-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops>, <mailto:sidrops-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 13:50:30 -0000

Hi Sriram,

On Sun, 24 Feb 2019, Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) wrote:

> >> A better definition of minimal ROA as outlined above will take care of
> >> the misunderstanding. The draft did recognize that the IP prefixes
> >> planned to be announced in the future or intermittently (when needed)
> >> may be included in the ROA. Please see the following paragraph from
> >> Section 5.1:
> >>
> >  This is not very helpful. "when needed" is fuzzy. Needed in six month?
> >Do you know when a DDoS occurs? The draft supposes that needed is very
> >short-term.
> 
> The draft does not presuppose when the prefixes may need to be 
> announced. The time frame is up to the prefix owner. Once the prefix 
> owner decides what prefixes (currently announced or intended to be 
> announced) should be covered by the ROA (or ROAs), the draft merely 
> offers recommendations for minimizing the attack surface. The example 
> in Section 5.1 illustrates this for the DDoS case. (One more example 
> can be added there to further drive home the point.) The example is 
> agnostic about if/when the DDoS mitigation prefixes may need to be 
> announced.
> 
  sorry but I really don't see how this limits the attack surface, in 
case where the configured more specific prefix is announced very 
occasionally.

> >  What I tried to say is that the authors of the wiki page draw
> >incorrect conclusions, probably based on misleading insights from the
> >draft.
> 
> I read the DECIX wiki page.  It is not clear to me what you mean by 
> incorrect conclusions on that page with regard to ROA/maxlength . I 
> would appreciate if you can clarify or cite some examples.
> 
  To give one example: Your draft suggests to not use the max length 
field, which means "ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length 
as the max length if the user does not specify a max length." [RFC 7115]

  Option 3 in the wiki page, they will set the max length to the max 
length of the IP version (e.g., /32 for v4). This is different to your 
proposal.

  Based on what you wrote, each member that intends to send a 
blackholing announcement would need to create a corresponding ROA. 
Option 3, actually, tries to solve the problem when members forget to do 
this.



Cheers
  matthias

-- 
Matthias Waehlisch
.  Freie Universitaet Berlin, Computer Science
.. http://www.cs.fu-berlin.de/~waehl