Return-Path: X-Original-To: sidrops@ietf.org Delivered-To: sidrops@mail2.ietf.org Received: from [10.244.22.182] (unknown [4.156.85.76]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7646A109E1AE4; Mon, 29 Jun 2026 07:44:21 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=ietf.org; s=ietf1; t=1782744261; bh=iwpH4PU7VBLFtofowbS/OTZ+LXKHfPvJmuIDX8jsHG0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Reply-To:Date; b=DWDq7lJ1VMuD1P39xM1fJ3Iz5urm4p2qZeBt6QMzURunw5BWWdIK4dgBgX1FP0p6g CTF1V1j2IB8j4j2hIf8LJ+KKPpF1ACKZbYLw/mqVLJU9PrMACHth3uMaN+NxH2z1MG rCKa53g9YTVu6900KwCxH5dzksANdM2+LCC+ETJc= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: internet-drafts@ietf.org To: X-Test-IDTracker: no X-IETF-IDTracker: 12.67.1 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated Precedence: bulk Message-ID: <178274426137.2005584.6657335171446274700@dt-datatracker-f9b87776f-xzl65> Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 07:44:21 -0700 Message-ID-Hash: 5EGC63TQLAEEOCFSRCGLYFGOPA5RV64Q X-Message-ID-Hash: 5EGC63TQLAEEOCFSRCGLYFGOPA5RV64Q X-MailFrom: internet-drafts@ietf.org X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-sidrops.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header CC: sidrops@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6 Reply-To: sidrops@ietf.org Subject: =?utf-8?q?=5BSidrops=5D_I-D_Action=3A_draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in?= =?utf-8?q?-bgp-12=2Etxt?= List-Id: A list for the SIDR Operations WG Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-12.txt is now available. It is a work item of the SIDR Operations (SIDROPS) WG of the IETF. Title: Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation States in BGP Path Attributes Authors: Job Snijders Tobias Fiebig Massimiliano Stucchi Name: draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-12.txt Pages: 15 Dates: 2026-06-29 Abstract: This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) derived validation states in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE being sent across external BGP (EBGP) sessions. Annotating routes with BGP Path Attributes carried across EBGP sessions signaling validation states may cause needless flooding of BGP UPDATE messages through the global Internet routing system, for example when Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are issued, or are revoked, or when RPKI-To-Router sessions are terminated. Operators should ensure RPKI-derived validation states are not signaled in BGP Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE being sent across EBGP sessions. Specifically, operators should not associate Prefix Origin Validation state with BGP routes using any form of BGP Communities carried across EBGP session. The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp/ There is also an HTMLized version available at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-12 A diff from the previous version is available at: https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-12 Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at: rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts