Re: [Sidrops] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-07: (with COMMENT)

[Tim Bruijnzeels <[e-mail]>]

Hi Benjamin,

My apologies. While updating -07 based on the review comments I found that I overlooked your response.

See response in-line, I am including these in the -08 that will follow shortly.

> On 10 Apr 2019, at 05:27, Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-07: No Objection
> 
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> 
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> 
> 
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal/
> 
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thank you for keeping the diff from RFC 7730 tidy!
> 
> Abstract
> 
>   their CA certificate.  In particular it allows TAs to change the set
>   of Internet Number Resources included in the RFC3779 extension of
>   their certificate.
> 
> Neither "Internet Number" nor "Number Resources" appears in RFC 3779 that I
> can see.  (On a quick skim, I'm still not sure if we mean AS number or IP
> address/prefix.)
> 

ack, clarified.


> Section 2.1
> 
>   the trust anchor per se.  In the RPKI, certificates contain
>   extensions that represent Internet Number Resources (INRs) [RFC3779].
> 

good point, I am used to this term so I took it for granted. Now clarified.


> (As above, I don't see INRs mentioned in RFC 3779.)
> 
> Since comments are new in this rev of TAL, do we want to caution consumers
> that implementations may not necessarily support comments yet?

I added the following section:

1.2. Changes from RFC7730

The TAL format defined in this document differs from the definition in [RFC7730] in that: 

	• it allows for the use of the HTTPS scheme in URIs; and
	• it allows for the inclusion of an optional comment section.

Note that current Relying Parties may not support this new format yet. Therefore it is RECOMMENDED that a Trust Anchor operator maintains a [RFC7730] TAL file for a time as well until they are satisfied that RP tooling has been updated.


> 
> Section 2.3
> 
>   The trust anchor MUST contain a stable key.  This key MUST NOT change
>   when the certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR
>   extension(s), when the certificate is renewed prior to expiration, or
>   for any reason other than a key change.
> 
> (This seems a bit tautological...)
> 
>   If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a
>   putative trust anchor, for any reason, including key rollover, the
>   entity MUST remove the object from the location referenced in the
>   TAL.
> 
> Certain classes of attacker could continue to publish the last-known
> certificate as a trust anchor and prevent this withdrawl from taking
> effect; we should probably cover that in the security considerations.
> 

see below 2.4, or am I missing another point here?

> Section 2.4
> 
> We say that it's RECOMMENDED to have different domains (so as to get
> different IP addresses) but this example shows only a single domain.
> 
> Section 4
> 
>   Note that a Man in the Middle (MITM) cannot produce a CA certificate
>   that would be considered valid according to the process described in
>   Section 3.  [...]
> 
> I think the key part is that the attacker cannot produce a *new* CA
> certificate that differs from a legitimate one, but they can MITM the HTTPS
> connection and present a legitimate (but potentially stale) CA certificate.

We have this (slightly re-worded text) in the Security section:

Note that, although a Man in the Middle (MITM) cannot produce a CA
certificate that would be considered valid according to the process
described in Section 3, this attack can prevent that the Relying Party
learns about an updated CA certificate.

This does not go on to clarify the consequences of such possible attacks, but I believe this is sufficient warning to implementers.


> 
>   o  DNS names in Repository Server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the
>      wildcard character "*".
> 
> Would a Relying Party ever reject the HTTPS connection (and thus, the
> delivered TA) if a wildcard certificate is presented for the HTTPS
> connection?

This is most likely controlled by the HTTPS client library used by the RP software. In some cases it may not be possible to tweak the behaviour. Therefore I think the SHOULD NOT is the right level. 


> 
> Section 5
> 
>   This TAL does not directly provide a list of resources covered by the
>   referenced self-signed CA certificate.  Instead, the RP is referred
>   to the trust anchor itself and the INR extension(s) within this
>   certificate.  This provides necessary operational flexibility, but it
>   also allows the certificate issuer to claim to be authoritative for
>   any resource.  Relying parties should either have great confidence in
>   the issuers of such certificates that they are configuring as trust
>   anchors, or they should issue their own self-signed certificate as a
>   trust anchor and, in doing so, impose constraints on the subordinate
>   certificates.
> 
> Are there any external databases that a RP could consult to affect the
> decision of whether to believe that a TA should actually be claiming the
> indicated resource(s)?  (It would be a bit silly, given that this is the
> RPKI already, but still...)

I think this is out of scope for this document. But the RIRs do publish their stats here on the NRO website:
https://www.nro.net/about/rirs/statistics/





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