Re: [Sidrops] New Version Notification for draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress-00.txt

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Fri, 04 January 2019 13:53 UTC

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From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] New Version Notification for draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress-00.txt
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internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote on 03/01/2019 21:55:
>     It is useful fpr RPKI-based Origin Validation to classify and mark
>     prefixes for all ingress, redistribution, and egress policies.  For
>     egress policy, it is important that the classification uses the
>     effective origin AS of the processed route, which may specifically be
>     altered by the commonly available knobs such as removing private ASs,
>     confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS.

good point.  Are there any bgp stacks which currently implement this?

Nick