Re: [Sidrops] New Version Notification for draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress-00.txt

[Ruediger Volk <[e-mail]>]

Nick Hilliard wrote:
  > [e-mail] wrote on 03/01/2019 21:55:
  > >     It is useful fpr RPKI-based Origin Validation to classify and mark
  > >     prefixes for all ingress, redistribution, and egress policies.  For
  > >     egress policy, it is important that the classification uses the
  > >     effective origin AS of the processed route, which may specifically be
  > >     altered by the commonly available knobs such as removing private ASs,
  > >     confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS.
  > 
  > good point.  Are there any bgp stacks which currently implement this?
all implementations relevant for my network (NOT an empty set) do NOT conform.

I guess the better question is:
which implementation actually do the right thing?
(congrats to the implementor!)

(and the next: what are the planned fixes?)
The draft does not change ROV, it just asks that application
in certain circumstance MUST be correct - that seem to be very
easy to neglect.

Most thinking about ROV application (and controlling correctnes of
route announcements) tends to focus on ingress policy.
I started late to seriously look at the egress - but I take
the robustnes principle serious - and in security matters
essentially the "be conservative" part applies.

When I started to consider requirements for my egress filtering
I hit the interesting cases, and immediately thought
"implementors most likely are missing these [corner?] cases"

Ruediger