Re: [Sidrops] RPKI Signed Checklists - draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc-00

Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl> Fri, 05 February 2021 09:01 UTC

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From: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 10:01:09 +0100
Cc: sidrops@ietf.org
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To: Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/SZTma94EjBYKfIAdmABNkgBUegI>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] RPKI Signed Checklists - draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc-00
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Dear Job, WG,

> On 4 Feb 2021, at 18:33, Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> Dear Working Group,
> 
> I've produced a specification which at a high level might appear similar
> to RTA, but has fundamentally different semantics.
> 
> RTA enables multiple signers to attest exactly one hash for an unnamed
> digital object, but RSC on the other hand enables a single signer to
> attest one or more named digital objects.
> 
> I believe the ability to pass filenames around will greatly improve
> operations for administrators.
> 
> Another advantage of RSC should be that in closely following the RFC
> 6488 template the burden of implementation is significantly reduced.
> 
> I would appreciate the working group taking a look and considering
> adoption. After adoption the IANA early allocation procedure can be used
> to obtain OIDs, after which running code can demonstrated, and then
> perhaps onwards to deployment.

I have spoken with the other co-authors of the RTA document. We are not oppositional to this work.

I think some words to this extend were expressed earlier, but again, if the working group prefers to have a single signed object which does not include a certificate and CRL chain for out-of-band validation, then a much simpler profile based on rpki signed objects (6488), as you are proposing, makes perfect sense.

I believe that a possible constructive way forward would be to adopt your proposal and define single signed RSC objects there. I will repeat my support in the appropriate thread.

The existing work on RTA can then be modified to leverage RSCs for other use cases. So rather then re-defining the signatures, RTAs could include one or more RSC objects. E.g.:

1) out-of-band validation

RTA could define a profile where a user can be sent an RSC, and some or all CA certificates and CRLs needed for validation for complete out-of-band validation. The CMS profile allows to include these, but 6488 does not, and if we do not wish to complicate RSC with this concern, then a level of indirection can help.

2) multi-signing

For those use cases where multiple signatures across different resource sets *are* required (yes, I know this is a corner case), the RTA can define a profile where multiple single signed RSC objects are bundled together.

Of course there are details to cover, but hopefully this gives a good high-level idea, and this approach will allow us all to work constructively together on complementary work.

So, we intend to draft a new version of the RTA specification along these lines. Please speak up if you feel this is not a good way forward.

Kind regards
Tim


> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Job
> 
> ----- Forwarded message from internet-drafts@ietf.org -----
> 
> Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2021 09:20:26 -0800
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> To: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc-00.txt
> 
> 
> A new version of I-D, draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Job Snijders and posted to the
> IETF repository.
> 
> Name:		draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc
> Revision:	00
> Title:		RPKI Signed Checklists
> Document date:	2021-02-04
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		8
> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc-00.txt
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc/
> Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc
> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc-00
> 
> 
> Abstract:
>   This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile
>   for a general purpose listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use
>   with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  The objective is
>   to allow an attestation, in the form of a listing of one or more
>   checksums of arbitrary digital objects (files), to be signed "with
>   resources", and for validation to provide a means to confirm a
>   specific Internet Resource Holder produced the signed checklist.  The
>   profile is intended to provide for the signing of a checksum listing
>   with an arbitrary set of Internet Number Resources.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> The IETF Secretariat
> 
> 
> 
> ----- End forwarded message -----
> 
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