Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV

[Job Snijders <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 10:19:23AM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
> > On 22 Feb 2022, at 09:51, Di Ma <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > It seems to be a good idea to do signaling and have a sort of signed
> > object for policy indicator :-)
> 
> I think we need a model where we can have valid/invalid/not-found (or
> equivalent) for paths.

Do we really? Slide 10 "BGPsec is protocol, not policy":
https://archive.nanog.org/meetings/nanog52/presentations/Tuesday/Bush-bgpsec.pdf

> Then we people can turn validation on with much less risk, and people
> can start implementing BGPSec on their routers independently with more
> immediate (albeit initially small) benefit.

I am not so sure about the above, it seems the reasoning stems from a
desire to seek compromise without regard for the consequences of such
settlement. The notion of "less risk" needs to be quantified more
precisely to have meaning.

I understand the goal of BGPsec deployment to be to reject
BGPsec-invalid paths, that's all. If the signatures are trash: don't
accept it, I don't see 'middleground'.

Are there any scenarios in which one would want to accept BGPsec invalid
paths? Similarly, RP implementations discard malformed ROAs, network
operators reject RPKI ROV-invalid BGP updates.

If people perceive risk: don't enable BGPsec, let others be the early
adaptors. It is early days, lots of software still has to be written,
lots of testing is required.

> Note that all this is orthogonal to ASPA. ASPA essentially says
> whether paths are plausible, and BGPSec (valid path) says what
> actually happened.

Yes, the above is an accurate summary.

> Though if ASPA informs that an adjacency is invalid then this could
> perhaps be valuable input to BGPSec path validation with regards to
> downgrade detection.

Only time and research can tell whether it is a useful signal to
transfer from one plane to another plane.

Regards,

Job