[Sidrops] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01

Linda Dunbar via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 17 March 2020 21:53 UTC

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Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 14:53:35 -0700
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Subject: [Sidrops] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01
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Reviewer: Linda Dunbar
Review result: Not Ready

I have reviewed this document as part of the Ops area directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Ops area directors.
Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

The document claims that it highlights an important use case of origin
validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of correct
implementation in this context. But I don't see where the "Use Case" is
described. It seems to me that the document should have more sections to
describe the Use Case and the procedure of Egress Export of the RPKI validated
Origins.

Section 3 Egress Processing only has one sentence stating that
"When applied to egress policy, validation state MUST be determined using the
effective origin AS of the route as it will (or would) be announced to the
peer." What other choices there are ?   Are there any routers that support  RFC
6480 RPKI  not performing this step? how?

My two cents.

Linda Dunbar