[Sidrops] Re: Call for WG Adoption of draft-snij-sidrops-constraining-rpki-trust-anchors

Bob Beck <beck@obtuse.com> Tue, 27 January 2026 16:10 UTC

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From: Bob Beck <beck@obtuse.com>
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Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 09:10:29 -0700
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Subject: [Sidrops] Re: Call for WG Adoption of draft-snij-sidrops-constraining-rpki-trust-anchors
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While I believe using the word “constraint” in this confuses the issue, I support adoption. 

This is no different than the external-to-the-PKI limits to trust that web browsers can put on trusting a certificate today. Codifying that rpki clients can do this to ensure that the expectation that they might, and what the consequences are, is reasonable to do. 



> On Jan 27, 2026, at 08:07, Carlos Martinez-Cagnazzo <carlos@xt6labs.io> wrote:
> 
> Hi all, 
> I believe this is valuable work. I support adopting this draft as a WG item.
> /Carlos
> On 19/1/26 9:46 AM, Luigi Iannone wrote:
>> All,
>> 
>> The authors have asked the SIDROPS WG to adopt the document draft-snij-sidrops-constraining-rpki-trust-anchors (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-snij-sidrops-constraining-rpki-trust-anchors/)
>> 
>> Title: Constraining RPKI Trust Anchors
>> 
>> Abstract:
>>   This document describes an approach for Resource Public Key
>>    Infrastructure (RPKI) Relying Parties (RPs) to impose locally
>>    configured Constraints on cryptographic products subordinate to Trust
>>    Anchors (TAs).  The ability to constrain a Trust Anchor operator's
>>    effective signing authority to a limited set of Internet Number
>>    Resources (INRs) allows Relying Parties to enjoy the potential
>>    benefits of assuming trust - within a bounded scope.  The specified
>>    approach and configuration format allow RPKI operators to communicate
>>    efficiently about observations related to Trust Anchor operations.
>> 
>> 
>> This email formally opens the two weeks Call for Adoption.
>> 
>> If you are supporting adoption, please state so.
>> If you have concerns, please detail them.
>> 
>> Please voice your opinion for the SIDROPS WG adoption of this document by 2 February 2026.  
>>   For the SIDROps WG Chairs, 
>> Luigi
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
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>> To unsubscribe send an email to sidrops-leave@ietf.org
>> 
> -- 
> --
> Carlos Martinez-Cagnazzo
> XT6Labs.IO
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