From nobody Fri Sep 4 13:40:52 2020 Return-Path: X-Original-To: sidrops@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidrops@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD6933A0FC0 for ; Fri, 4 Sep 2020 13:40:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.099 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=nlnetlabs.nl Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0qud4yHD2-ie for ; Fri, 4 Sep 2020 13:40:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dicht.nlnetlabs.nl (dicht.nlnetlabs.nl [185.49.140.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 54F213A0CE7 for ; Fri, 4 Sep 2020 13:40:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [IPv6:2001:981:4b52:1:55e4:165c:ff49:a540] (unknown [IPv6:2001:981:4b52:1:55e4:165c:ff49:a540]) by dicht.nlnetlabs.nl (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 82E4F2456E; Fri, 4 Sep 2020 22:40:46 +0200 (CEST) Authentication-Results: dicht.nlnetlabs.nl; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=nlnetlabs.nl Authentication-Results: dicht.nlnetlabs.nl; spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=tim@nlnetlabs.nl DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=nlnetlabs.nl; s=default; t=1599252046; bh=K7yI1fWFQvp/RCHeO0d95geIrtYbyO4KALyR5PGCnYc=; h=Subject:From:In-Reply-To:Date:Cc:References:To; b=QLspyPa19YXoURG+Id+wZpDz6fTRrmUQKKbUcdtJUzWn28QHcUx4HuzYuOAS0jmwA zjXcgK2uq4bpG1bd4FD4fcVeKbk6xRE93HZjfbO6Vhdn8/AeQocUDLVWBt7+pmxvgk LFLBe4J48apbfqGXrHbnnNJS1rcUtY70LbYfOWRE= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 13.4 \(3608.120.23.2.1\)) From: Tim Bruijnzeels In-Reply-To: <24399.58769.547600.368430@oz.mt.att.com> Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2020 22:40:46 +0200 Cc: sidrops@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <8AAB93F3-6024-438E-9A32-5AE583A51C06@nlnetlabs.nl> References: <20200817163134.29aa1a6b@glaurung.nlnetlabs.nl> <20200818083659.1922a98c@grisu.home.partim.org> <6cebcc89-3e07-8a85-3813-b4ae9887d119@verizon.net> <20200826122539.52493813@glaurung.nlnetlabs.nl> <24393.25181.84151.476185@oz.mt.att.com> <4d77e33d-25bb-03a7-7a7e-1535bb2e1f18@verizon.net> <24399.58769.547600.368430@oz.mt.att.com> To: Jay Borkenhagen X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3608.120.23.2.1) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Sidrops] 6486bis: Failed Fetches X-BeenThere: sidrops@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: A list for the SIDR Operations WG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 04 Sep 2020 20:40:51 -0000 Hi, > On 2 Sep 2020, at 20:33, Jay Borkenhagen wrote: >=20 > Steve, >=20 > Stephen Kent writes: >> The crux of the issue is whether it is preferable to reject all = objects=20 >> at a pub point if an error is detected (until the error is = rectified),=20 >> and thus potentially treat many more routes as having an unknown=20 >> verification status, or to accept bits and pieces of data from a pub=20= >> point with the potential that some routes will be treated as valid, = even=20 >> if they are invalid. To me, that is a value judgement to be made by=20= >> network operators, not by developers of RP software. [...] >=20 > No, there is a bit more to it than that. >=20 > I want my network's routers and those of all other networks to be fed > with VRPs that represent all the verified and legitimate published > origin-ASN intentions of verified, legitimate IP number resource > holders. >=20 > Clearly the challenge there is in determining "verified" and > "legitimate." In creating the rules (to be documented in > standards-track RFCs) for those determinations, I would like the input > of all SIDROPS participants to be valued, including the input of the > RPKI designers, the CA- and RP-implementers, the RIRs, and the network > operators. >=20 > To my point: if RP-implementers feel that the "bits and pieces of > data" (to use your words) should be considered to best make those > determinations, such input should be welcomed; conversely, if > RP-implementers feel that strict publication rules and accompanying > strict handling of retrieved records together create the best way to > make those determinations, we all should listen to what they have to > say. I don't think it's entirely fair to say that us 'developers' are willing = to create security issues for network operators. This document is still under discussion, and there simply are still = cases that are not fully discussed, e.g. how to filter VRPs if a = publication point is found to be bad - to which I posted a suggestion = only last week. I thought that discussion phases were meant for that. To = look at things from different angles. I am quite certain though that = consensus can be reached if we have constructive talks, and that = implementation can follow quickly when it does. To the point of "bits and pieces". Rejecting a full publication point is = the easiest to reason about, so I can see its appeal. That said, = consider the case where a ROA is invalid because it contains a prefix no = longer held by the CA. Instead of rejecting the complete PP for a CA = certificate, and filtering out all VRPs overlapping the resources on it, = one could also reject all the invalid ROAs and only filter out VRPs that = have any overlap with those ROAs. I understand this is a bit more = elaborate, but not dramatically different. As far as I can tell it is = just as secure in that this cannot result in RPKI invalid announcements = because of a single invalid ROA object. Note that I talk about ROA objects that can be fetched, and are known to = be current. I.e. the actual manifest content. And provided they can be = parsed and validated so you know which resources are affected. If any = objects are missing or obsolete then assume the worst - I actually made = statements to that effect months ago. In any case, I can live with the reject-all model for its simplicity. = But I would like to hear an operator input on whether this is indeed = desirable. And that the consequence of child CAs - even NIR sized ones - = blinking out for a few hours every now and then is an acceptable price = for this simplicity. Tim >=20 >> Experience with X.509 cert extensions suggests that the approach I = noted=20 >> is preferable. Saying that older RPs can ignore objects they don't=20 >> understand introduces ambiguity in RP behavior, which is precisely = the=20 >> concern that motivated the effort to generate 6486bis. >=20 > Ambiguity is bad in any technical endeavor where precision is needed. > And we're here discussing this now because there was ambiguity in > rfc6486 (not assigning blame -- I missed it, too). But I don't see > how it follows that if/when ASPA (for example) is standardized, that > older RPs should be required to throw away all records retrieved from > PPs whose MFTs now cite ASPA records. >=20 > Thanks. >=20 > Jay B. >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ > Sidrops mailing list > Sidrops@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops