[Sidrops] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-07: (with COMMENT)

[Adam Roach via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-07: Yes

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)


Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks to everyone who worked on this document.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I find it curious and somewhat problematic that there is not a section,
equivalent to the existing section 4, that deals with RSYNC considerations. In
particular, the attack described in the first paragraph of section 4 appears
to be unavoidable when the TAL contains an RSYNC URI. Minimally, this document
should draw attention to that fact, at least in the Security Considerations
section. Ideally, it would deprecate -- or at least discourage -- the use of
RSYNC URIs for this reason.

[This would be a discuss-level comment if this were a green-field document, but
I don't want to stand in the way of improving an existing mechanism, so I'm only
leaving it as a comment. The authors may choose to move forward without fixing
this issue]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§2.2:

>  In this document we define a Trust Anchor URI as a URI that can be
>  used to retrieved a current Trust Anchor certificate

Nit: "...to retrieve..."