Re: [Sidrops] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-rtr-keying-02

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Wed, 26 December 2018 15:12 UTC

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Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2018 10:12:39 -0500
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Scott Bradner <sob@sobco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-rtr-keying-02
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>>   all private keys MUST be protected when at rest in a secure
>>   fashion.
> that use of a MUST is commendable but its not exactly an
> interoperability issue

is

    The operator MUST ensure that the installed CA certificate is valid.

an interop issue?

this is an opsec doc; not protocol on the wire.  hence its MUSTs are
security and operational prudence.

but enough already.

randy