Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV

Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl> Tue, 22 February 2022 08:41 UTC

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From: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
In-Reply-To: <m28ru3ofyq.wl-randy@psg.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 09:41:36 +0100
Cc: Di Ma <madi@juicybun.cn>, SIDR Operations WG <sidrops@ietf.org>
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References: <m2h78roqbp.wl-randy@psg.com> <7FBC2063-2404-4BF9-836E-210629C4BA63@juicybun.cn> <m28ru3ofyq.wl-randy@psg.com>
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/qGnv3vNvDxsEPRcveTif9kH31c8>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Hi,

> On 22 Feb 2022, at 02:19, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:
> 
> di:
> 
>> I don’t care the way we/they see ROV but the way we use it.
>> 
>> ROV is good as long as it can remedy accidental misconfigurations that
>> bring about routing security problem/catastrophe.
>> 
>> If someone doesn't think ROV is not a security mechanism from
>> cryptography perspective, I settle for that.
> 
> operationally, it is trivial to subvert/attack ROV; and that has
> nothing to do with the cryptography.  it's simple net ops.

Which is why I think it would be very good to re-double the WG efforts
on moving ASPA forward.

It was also suggested in the past few months that BGPSec should get
a new impulse by supporting it in the RIPE NCC hosted RPKI:
https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2021-September/004410.html

My responses in that thread were a bit skeptical to the point of being
misunderstood as obstruction to the idea. I am not against BGPSec itself.
Far from it. I just want to believe that it can work.

My issue was about how BGPSec can be implemented incrementally and 
scale *automatically*. I know of the idea that operators turn it on (and off?)
because they somehow know (out-of-band?) that it's safe to do so. But,
(1) I don't see this scale, (2) this can result in outages if operators get
it wrong (path invalid), and (3) I don't see this work cross-transit - 
which is probably where the problem of spoofed origin attacks is worse.

In my view, this comes from the property that BGPSec validated paths can
only be valid or invalid. There is no 'unknown' - because in a nutshell
then adversaries could do a simple downgrade attack.

All that said, if we could have a constructive discussion about solving
the BGPSec deployment challenges then I would welcome it very much. Perhaps,
it would be possible to signal (with signed objects in the RPKI) when
BGPSec is applicable - and when a downgrade has happened.. somehow? No, I
don't have the answer but we may want to put our minds together.

Tim

> 
> randy
> 
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