Re: [Sidrops] proposed, revised text for Section 6

Oleg Muravskiy <oleg@ripe.net> Thu, 07 May 2020 17:52 UTC

Return-Path: <oleg@ripe.net>
X-Original-To: sidrops@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: sidrops@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D98CE3A07F0 for <sidrops@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 7 May 2020 10:52:48 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Tss163pfigH8 for <sidrops@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 7 May 2020 10:52:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mahimahi.ripe.net (mahimahi.ripe.net [IPv6:2001:67c:2e8:11::c100:1372]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C13E43A07F5 for <sidrops@ietf.org>; Thu, 7 May 2020 10:52:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from allealle.ripe.net ([193.0.23.12]) by mahimahi.ripe.net with esmtps (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92.3) (envelope-from <oleg@ripe.net>) id 1jWkhJ-0002ul-9L; Thu, 07 May 2020 19:52:37 +0200
Received: from sslvpn.ipv6.ripe.net ([2001:67c:2e8:9::c100:14e6] helo=[IPv6:2001:67c:2e8:1200::7a5]) by allealle.ripe.net with esmtps (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92.3) (envelope-from <oleg@ripe.net>) id 1jWkhJ-0004UV-50; Thu, 07 May 2020 19:52:37 +0200
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 13.4 \(3608.80.23.2.2\))
From: Oleg Muravskiy <oleg@ripe.net>
In-Reply-To: <cc0fb3bc-1ebf-9417-fa60-361cb899b938@verizon.net>
Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 19:52:36 +0200
Cc: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>, "sidrops@ietf.org" <sidrops@ietf.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <02AD118C-6267-4C83-8252-1DD710D4C4AA@ripe.net>
References: <557f0928-c7b1-4b8d-b3b6-078733f7ef8a.ref@verizon.net> <557f0928-c7b1-4b8d-b3b6-078733f7ef8a@verizon.net> <1065C1CC-191A-4CFF-A87C-4F1CB165F303@ripe.net> <507640b8-30e7-9f95-e6ed-adba12efb090@verizon.net> <7A134E0C-52E1-4FAD-A4E6-D971EFCDC63E@nlnetlabs.nl> <cc0fb3bc-1ebf-9417-fa60-361cb899b938@verizon.net>
To: Stephen Kent <stkent@verizon.net>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3608.80.23.2.2)
X-ACL-Warn: Delaying message
X-RIPE-Signature: c408758d4ce2e8eb06762a65a3365b74e9b870784b87d0c14b36b130be2cb445
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/vGOBFVTo0Tm7yLpXyUjq7zCTSE4>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] proposed, revised text for Section 6
X-BeenThere: sidrops@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: A list for the SIDR Operations WG <sidrops.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/sidrops>, <mailto:sidrops-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/sidrops/>
List-Post: <mailto:sidrops@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:sidrops-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops>, <mailto:sidrops-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 17:52:49 -0000

Steve,

> On 7 May 2020, at 17:38, Stephen Kent <stkent@verizon.net> wrote:
> 
> Tim,
> 
>> ...
>> I agree.
>> 
>> I think all CA implementations already do the following, which is implied by RFC 6487 and 6481 in particular. But the text is not sufficiently explicit. Updates will help, especially RP software.
>> 
>> * There is only ever one (1!) *current* CA certificate issued for a given key (implied by RFC6492)
>> * This CA certificate has the following SIA entries:
>>     - id-ad-caRepository pointing to its full publication point
>>     - id-ad-rpkiManifest pointing to a manifest in that publication point
>>     - (still optionally) id-ad-rpkiNotify pointing to the RRDP (RFC 8182) notification file
>> 
>> * For a CA certificate (i.e. a single key) there will be ONE current MFT only
>> * For a CA certificate (i.e. a single key) there will be ONE current CRL only
>> * That CRL name and hash MUST match the one and only .crl file on the MFT
>> * Any issued (EE or CA) certificate under this CA certificate (single key) MUST use a CRLDP that matches the name of this .crl file, under the issuing CA certificate's id-ad-caRepository
> 
> This all sounds appropriate to me. I can state these assumptions in the intro for Section 6.

I like this as well.

> What do we want to do if we encounter two or more .crl files in a manifest? use the first one, ignore any others, and issue a warning?
> 
> What do we want to do if the CRLDP in a CA cert does not match the file name in the manifest? Issue a warning and use the .crl file from the manifest?

I would suggest that we only use a CRL that is on a manifest AND matches the CRLDP in a CA cert (and all the above conditions that Tim mentioned are also true). If there are also other CRLs in the manifest, we ignore them with a warning.  

If there are CRLs in the manifest, but none matches the CRLDP, we continue as if there is no valid CRL (so follow rules of section 6.1 of your revised text).

Oleg