Re: [Sidrops] Adam Roach's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-lta-use-cases-05: (with COMMENT)

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Tue, 30 April 2019 16:27 UTC

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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>, Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>
Cc: Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, sidrops@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-lta-use-cases@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org
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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 11:27:24 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Adam Roach's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-lta-use-cases-05: (with COMMENT)
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This seems like an even better resolution to the problem. Thanks, Randy.

/a

On 4/30/19 11:24 AM, Randy Bush wrote:
>>> Please consider adding the boilerplate specified in RFC 8174.
>> Or, alternatively (and my preference), re-word that brief paragraph in
>> the Security Considerations so that it doesn't use "MUST".  I find
>> "Hence they MUST be implemented to assure the local constraint." hard
>> to understand anyway, so re-wording might help.
> as mirja kühlewind pointed out, that paragraph was a bungle.  how about
>
> 6.  Security Considerations
>
>     Though the above use cases are all constrained to local contexts,
>     they violate the model of a single Global RPKI, albeit to meet real
>     operational needs.  Hence the result must be able to be validated as
>     if the changed data were part of the validatable Global RPKI while
>     including the local context, perhaps with the addition of trust
>     anchors or authenticatable patching of trust.
>
>     Modification 'recipes' may lack authentication.  E.g., if
>     modifications to the tree are passed around a la SLURM files, see
>     [RFC8416], what was object security becomes, at best, transport
>     security, or authentication by other trust domains such as PGP.
>
> randy
>