Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-01: Handling unknowns
Alexander Azimov <a.e.azimov@gmail.com> Thu, 25 July 2019 20:20 UTC
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From: Alexander Azimov <a.e.azimov@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 23:20:20 +0300
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To: "Jakob Heitz (jheitz)" <jheitz@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-01: Handling unknowns
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Jakob, I believe your reading of the ASPA verification procedure is incorrect. Section 4 defines pairs wise verification procedure (let's call pair_verification) which returns valid, invalid and unknown. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 define verification procedure for upstream and downstream path respectively. In these procedures, the 'valid' and 'unknown' outcome of pair_verification is the same. These procedures return 'valid', 'invalid' and 'unverifiable' (in case of valid AS_SEQ + presence of AS_SET). So, your assumption that the algorithm works when all ASes in the as-path make attestations is incorrect. To perform verification you don't need to split ASPATH into triplets (or even bigger windows). I sent previously a linear function that makes verification for the downstream path, for the upstream path it even simpler. Since you are already working on the implementation I suggest to discuss it in person before the end of this meeting. It makes me really anxious if the specification is unclear for implementers. чт, 25 июл. 2019 г. в 08:04, Jakob Heitz (jheitz) <jheitz@cisco.com>: > I believe the path verification algorithm works when all ASes in the > as-path > make attestations. If some of the ASes make no attestations, then a more > complete > algorithm is as follows: > > For every sequence (A, B, C) of consecutive ASes in an AS-path: > If A attests that B is not a provider and C attests that B is not a > provider, > then B leaked the route: B is transiting for free. The segment is invalid. > If either A or C attests that B is a provider, then the AS-path segment > (A, B, C) is valid. > If neither A nor C make an attestation, then the leak state is unknown. > Even if B lists both A and C as providers, it is not necessarily a leak, > because either A or C could consider B as a provider for some of their > routes, even though they don't attest to it. > > If all the path segments are valid, then the whole path is valid. > If any of the path segments is invalid, then the whole path is invalid. > Else, at least one path segment is unknown and one more rule must be > applied: for any sequence of ASes (A, B1, ..., Bn, C), if A attests that B1 > is not a provider and C attests that Bn is not a provider, then the AS-path > is invalid. This is for any number of Bx greater than 1. > > This algorithm breaks the AS-PATH into triples instead of pairs. > For example, the AS_PATH (A,B,C,D,E) is broken into the triples: > (A,B,C), (B,C,D), (C,D,E). > I find it easier to reason about it like that. > It can probably be re-worded into pairs. > > An additional point: > If AS-SETs exist then complete sequences between the AS-SETs can be > checked for invalidity. > The best such an AS-PATH can get is unknown, but it can also be verified > invalid. > > Regards, > Jakob. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Sidrops <sidrops-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of > internet-drafts@ietf.org > Sent: Monday, July 8, 2019 1:24 PM > To: i-d-announce@ietf.org > Cc: sidrops@ietf.org > Subject: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-01.txt > > > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts > directories. > This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF. > > Title : Verification of AS_PATH Using the Resource > Certificate Public Key Infrastructure and Autonomous System Provider > Authorization > Authors : Alexander Azimov > Eugene Bogomazov > Keyur Patel > Job Snijders > Filename : draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-01.txt > Pages : 10 > Date : 2019-07-08 > > Abstract: > This document defines the semantics of an Autonomous System Provider > Authorization object in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to > verify the AS_PATH attribute of routes advertised in the Border > Gateway Protocol. > > > > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification/ > > There are also htmlized versions available at: > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-01 > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-01 > > A diff from the previous version is available at: > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-01 > > > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of > submission > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. > > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ > > _______________________________________________ > Sidrops mailing list > Sidrops@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops > > _______________________________________________ > Sidrops mailing list > Sidrops@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops > -- Best regards, Alexander Azimov
- [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-01… Jakob Heitz (jheitz)
- Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verificatio… Alexander Azimov
- Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verificatio… Jakob Heitz (jheitz)
- Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verificatio… Alexander Azimov
- Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verificatio… Alexander Azimov
- Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verificatio… Jakob Heitz (jheitz)
- Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verificatio… Alexander Azimov