[Sidrops] Alissa Cooper's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidrops-rtr-keying-03: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Alissa Cooper <alissa@cooperw.in> Wed, 23 January 2019 19:52 UTC

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From: Alissa Cooper <alissa@cooperw.in>
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Cc: draft-ietf-sidrops-rtr-keying@ietf.org, Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sidrops@ietf.org
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Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:52:41 -0800
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Subject: [Sidrops] Alissa Cooper's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidrops-rtr-keying-03: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Alissa Cooper has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidrops-rtr-keying-03: Discuss

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As this is a BCP, I don't understand why transport encryption of the private
key is not normatively required. Could you explain?


Given that this document is ostensibly specifying a "best" current practice, I
would have expected a clearer expression of preference for the router-driven
method over the operator-driven method, e.g., something like BGPsec-speaking
routers MUST implement the router-driven method and MAY implement the
operator-driven method. Or if there is some exception case that makes that MUST
problematic, it would at least be good to emphasize which one of these is
actually "best" from a security perspective, even though the other one is being
specified and we know will be used.

Nit in Section 1:

s/gritty details/details of the BGPsec protocol/