[Sip] media-security-requirements and lawful intercept

["Dan Wing" <[e-mail]>]

Other SDOs have lawful intercept requirements, which are currently
captured in requirement R24 in 
draft-ietf-sip-media-security-requirements-00:

   "R24:   The media security key management protocol SHOULD 
           NOT allow end users to determine whether their 
           end-to-end interaction is subject to lawful 
           interception."

DTLS-SRTP was selected by IETF as the IETF's preferred mechanism
to establish SRTP keys for unicast, point-to-point SRTP sessions.

There appear to be two methods to meet R24 with DTLS-SRTP.  They
are:

   a. provide a network element on every SRTP call which relays
      media, performs a DTLS handshake, and decrypts and re-encrypts
      SRTP, or;

   b. have endpoints perform key disclosure for every call (using a 
      technique similar to draft-wing-sipping-srtp-key), and perform
      validation of that disclosed key on every call.

If these methods to meet R24 are deemed acceptable to other SDOs,
we don't find any reason for those SDOs to reject IETF's decision
to use DTLS-SRTP as the preferred mechanism to establish SRTP
keys for unicast, point-to-point SRTP sessions.

Comments welcome.
-d


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