Re: [Sipbrandy] WGLC: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec-03
Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Thu, 11 January 2018 21:07 UTC
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
In-Reply-To: <D67CD676.1F5199%jon.peterson@neustar.biz>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 16:07:26 -0500
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To: "Peterson, Jon" <jon.peterson@team.neustar>
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Subject: Re: [Sipbrandy] WGLC: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec-03
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> On Jan 11, 2018, at 12:03 PM, Peterson, Jon <jon.peterson@team.neustar> wrote: > > > Thanks for these notes Russ: > >> Major: >> >> In Section 4.3, I do not know what is meant by "STIR Profile for media >> confidentiality". > > I think we've been using that language as the name for this entire effort: > as a way to leverage STIR through a particular extension with its > incumbent behavior to get media confidentiality. Since media > confidentiality was definitely not a requirement of STIR initially, this > is effectively a profile, a narrow use case applying STIR to something > slightly different. I think SHAKEN set the precedent for profiling STIR > through an extension, and we are just following that. I'm not sure how to > make that more clear, though. I think we need to separate the authentication provided the signature in STIR and the ability for some other mechanism to leverage that signature to provide confidentiality. > >> >> Minor: >> >> I think the discussion in the first paragraph of Section 3.1 should be >> slightly expanded to be clear that we are not talking about integrity >> protection of SDP k= records. I'd prefer a MUST NOT statement. > > Fine by me. > >> >> In Section 4.1: s/SIP endpoints must acquire/SIP endpoints MUST acquire/ > > So... I don't think this language is stipulating implementation behavior > as such - it is expressing a practical necessity rather than something we > would test conformance with, I think? The spec then goes on to discuss the > actual protocol mechanisms you might use to actually acquire credentials. > If the "must" is annoying I can paraphrase to "as a matter of practical > necessity need to". Or maybe I need more RFC8174 sensitivity training. That change would help me. > >> >> In Section 4.2: >> s/should be discarded/SHOULD be discarded/ >> s/should be generated/SHOULD be generated/ > > These ones however I think you're right, we are talking about > implementation behavior. Thanks. Russ
- [Sipbrandy] WGLC: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec-03 Gonzalo Camarillo
- Re: [Sipbrandy] WGLC: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec… Gonzalo Camarillo
- Re: [Sipbrandy] WGLC: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec… Russ Housley
- Re: [Sipbrandy] WGLC: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec… Gonzalo Camarillo
- Re: [Sipbrandy] WGLC: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec… Peterson, Jon
- Re: [Sipbrandy] WGLC: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec… Peterson, Jon
- Re: [Sipbrandy] WGLC: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec… Russ Housley