Re: [Sipbrandy] [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-09

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Wed, 29 May 2019 15:53 UTC

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Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 08:53:16 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org, sipbrandy@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp.all@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sipbrandy] [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-09
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On Mon, May 27, 2019 at 07:15:03PM -0700, Sean Turner via Datatracker wrote:
> Reviewer: Sean Turner
> Review result: Has Issues
> 
> I had a read of the draft as well as the GENART and TSVART reviews (to avoid
> duplicating comments).
> 
> Summary: Ready with (minor) issues
> 
> Issues:
> 
> 0) I assume that the mismatch the TSVART refers to in the security
> considerations has to do with 1) changing 4568 to require encryption but not
> fail if authentication is not available, 2) pointing out that 4568's
> requirement is routinely ignore for end-to-end encryption because using TLS
> with intermediaries won't protect the SDP key, and 3) and reference errors (see
> the next issue).  On 1, that's kind the point of OSRTP - take the encryption
> you can get.  On 2, because it's the security considerations this document is
> just saying don't expect to get end-to-end.  Assuming, I've interpreted this I
> think this draft is okay.

Thanks for doing the cross-reference to the other reviews and thinking about the
raised issues.

> 1) I think these are just reference errors, but it would be good to double
> check these (and I hadn't seen a response yet - might have missed it):
> 
> S4: Not sure about these references too RFC7435.  Maybe they should be to RFC
> 4568 instead?
> 
> s/The security considerations of [RFC7435] apply to OSRTP,
> /The security considerations of [RFC4568] apply to OSRTP,
> 
> s/Section 8.3 of [RFC7435]/Section 8.3 of [RFC4568]
> 
> s/understood that the [RFC7435]/understood that the [RFC4568]
> 
> Bikesheds:
> 
> 0) The fact that it's Informational struck me as odd.
> 
> 1) The fact there are no updates listed also strikes me as odd.
> 
> Nits:
> 
> 0) s2: Nits reports an error with the para.  I think it's:
> 
> s/RFC 2119 [RFC2119] RFC 8174 [RFC8174]
> /RFC 2119 [RFC2119] [RFC8174]

The snippet in RFC 8174 has "BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174]" in this role.

-Ben

> 
> 1) s1, 2nd para: s/[RFC5939] ./[RFC5939].