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Re: [sipcore] rfc4244bis #44 (new): 4244bis-02: security section misleading

Mary Barnes <mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com> Mon, 08 November 2010 06:16 UTC

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Date: Mon, 08 Nov 2010 00:14:28 -0600
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From: Mary Barnes <mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com>
To: sipcore issue tracker <trac@tools.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [sipcore] rfc4244bis #44 (new): 4244bis-02: security section misleading
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I agree.  Removing this is consistent with some of the earlier text we
removed in terms handling and implications of missing information.

Mary.

On Sat, Nov 6, 2010 at 9:41 PM, sipcore issue tracker
<trac@tools.ietf.org> wrote:
> #44: 4244bis-02: security section misleading
>
>  Section 9 says:
>    With the level of security provided by TLS (SEC-req-3), the
>    information in the History-Info header can thus be evaluated to
>    determine if information has been removed by evaluating the indices
>    for gaps (SEC-req-1, SEC-req-2).  It would be up to the application
>    to define whether it can make use of the information in the case of
>    missing entries.
>
>  No, TLS doesn't do that.  TLS only guarantees you that the next-hop or
>  previous-hop is who its cert claims it to be (assuming you trust its
>  anchor), and prevents tampering by something in-between you and that
>  previous-hop or next-hop.  That doesn't mean that previous-hop or next-
>  hop, or some upstream/downstream entity beyond it, did not modify the H-I
>  entries - including in ways which you cannot possibly detect.  For example
>  it could have renumbered them, changed their content, etc.
>
>  This section-9 paragraph is wrong, and we won't be able to satisfy the
>  security requirements in appendix A.1  That's *OK*.  We're not going to
>  get better than that.  In fact, we basically need that behavior, since we
>  need PSTN Gateways to be able to generate H-I entries based on ISUP info
>  (even for numbers they don't own); and we need Diversion interworked to
>  H-I too.
>
> --
> ------------------------------------+---------------------------------------
>  Reporter:  hkaplan@…               |       Owner:
>     Type:  defect                  |      Status:  new
>  Priority:  minor                   |   Milestone:  milestone1
> Component:  rfc4244bis              |     Version:  2.0
>  Severity:  In WG Last Call         |    Keywords:
> ------------------------------------+---------------------------------------
>
> Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/sipcore/trac/ticket/44>
> sipcore <http://tools.ietf.org/sipcore/>
>
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