Re: [sipcore] Understanding Privacy: history invoked by UAS

"Worley, Dale R (Dale)" <> Thu, 11 November 2010 07:58 UTC

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From: "Worley, Dale R (Dale)" <>
To: "Elwell, John" <>, "" <>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 02:57:03 -0500
Thread-Topic: Understanding Privacy: history invoked by UAS
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Subject: Re: [sipcore] Understanding Privacy: history invoked by UAS
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From: [] On Behalf Of Elwell, John []

Suppose a request from A is targeted initially at B, this is mapped to C, and then to registered contact D. The UAS (D) puts Privacy: history in the response, and therefore prevents A learning about C and D. Fine.

Now, supposing D is not registered at the time, i.e., there is no registered contact for C. This results in a 4xx response to A. How do we ensure that the identity of C is not disclosed to A, in line with what is achieved when D is registered?

Actually, D isn't really the center of this.  If D's user wants to prevent his AOR (C) from being disclosed, he will have to make an arrangement with the home proxy for C.  The home proxy can add "Privacy: history" to any 4xx response it generates for requests to C.  Indeed, it will probably add "Privacy: history" to requests or responses to C even when D is registered.