RE: [Sipping-emergency] Comment about Charter [no privacy?]

["Brian Rosen" <[e-mail]>]

This is a good point.

 

This points out a common tension between groups seeking authenticity and
groups seeking privacy.

 

The emergency call authorities reasonably want to prevent forging of
location, which could be used to direct responders away from something bad
about to happen.  Individuals do not want their location to be able to be
tracked in some circumstances.   

 

In North America, the tension between privacy and location authenticity is
solved with legislation: the privacy right is explicitly waived when an
emergency call is placed.  It would be interesting to know if this is not
the case in other areas.  This is a geopriv issue, but we might have to send
some requirements to them over the issue.

 

Recognize that automatic reporting of location is implemented because all
too often the caller does not know where they are, or is unable to
communicate where they are, to the call taker.   When you make an emergency
call, you MUST provide location, and in every jurisdiction, it would be a
crime to falsely report your location.

 

I would think that given the history in geopriv over this issue, that we
aren't going to get IETF to publish an RFC where not reporting location is
incompliant with a spec; we have a sufficient number of people who feel
passionately that an individual cannot be COMPELLED to report location.
This is quite easily dealt with by using SHOULD language.  The emergency
call system can choose to accept such calls or not, as local regulations
dictate.  

 

The most straightforward method of providing authentication would be to have
the location object signed by a trusted entity.  I've had a running dialog
with James Winterbottom and his co-authors on this subject; I maintain it is
not practical to always have a trusted entity, but let's say, for this
discussion, that there is.  If only the location object itself is signed,
and no other identifying piece of information that attaches an identity to
the location, then you can assure that the location report itself has not
been modified, but you don't know that the object represents the location of
the entity presenting it (you are subject to a replay attack).   The only
way to be assured that the location object represents the entity presenting
it would be to have a credential or other identifier in the signed object
that was verifiable by the entity receiving the call as belonging to the
entity placing the call.  I have no idea what such a credential/identifier
could be because, as I will show, the entity that could reasonably sign the
LO doesn't have any identity for the entity placing the call when it has to
sign the object; they are entirely disconnected from one another.  This
thread is about how to make sure that whatever identifier is used, it can't
be used to specifically identify a person.  That still doesn't solve the
problems of what entities could reasonably assert location validation, and
how any form of anonymous, but authenticated, location could be provided.  I
have no suggestions.

 

Brian

 

  _____  

From: [e-mail]
[mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of Tschofenig Hannes
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2004 4:14 AM
To: 'James Winterbottom'; James M. Polk; [e-mail]
Subject: RE: [Sipping-emergency] Comment about Charter [no privacy?]

 

hi james, 

 

every document will have to address both privacy and security
considerations. the geopriv requirements draft gives a number of guidelines
but more work is needed when you apply it to an actual using protocol (such
as sip). the fact that you have pseudonyms is nice but still there are some
places where user names show up. for example, end-to-end security mechanisms
provide the recipient a way to authenticate you (and authorizate you based
on your authenticated identity) but if you want to experience anonymity then
the authorization functionality at the recipient is certainly more
difficult. 

 

ciao

hannes

 

 


  _____  


From: James Winterbottom [mailto:[e-mail]] 
Sent: Freitag, 29. Oktober 2004 08:32
To: James M. Polk; [e-mail]
Subject: RE: [Sipping-emergency] Comment about Charter [no privacy?]

Hi James, 

Doesn't "draft-ietf-geopriv-pres-02" suggest that a location
server/generator is able to transmit a location to a location recipient, be
that the target itself, or someone else. I believe that this is also covered
in RFC-3693 GeoPriv Requirements. In order to be able to transmit a
location, one must first be able to determine it!!! For the purposes of
transmitting location pseudonyms are also used, so I am not sure where the
tying to a user name comes in.

What was submitted by me is a set of requirements that the authors believe
need to be satisfied in order to meet the needs of emergency service
providers. There has been no discussion of not using or varying the existing
GeoPriv rulesets.

 

Cheers 
James 
  

-----Original Message----- 
From: [e-mail]
[mailto:[e-mail]] 
Sent: Friday, 29 October 2004 3:07 PM 
To: [e-mail] 
Subject: [Sipping-emergency] Comment about Charter [no privacy?] 

 

All 

In reading the charter for our new ECRIT BOF, I don't see mention of 
privacy concerns wrt the ability to track an endpoint based on some Loc 
Info Server (LIS) always knowing where that endpoint is (if nomadic or 
mobile), or tying a user(name) to a particular endpoint (regardless of what 
type it is). 

I thought privacy was agreed upon to be mentioned as a consideration? 

I know at least Jonathan and I brought it up, and I think I remember Jon 
agreeing to this consideration. 

We do not want to ignore the retention and distribution rules we so 
carefully built into the PIDF-LO 

cheers, 
James 

                                ******************* 
                 Truth is not to be argued... it is to be presented 

 

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