Re: AW: [Sipping-tispan] TISPAN requirements, first requiements

[Miguel Garcia <[e-mail]>]

Paul, once Roland has explained the issue, what is your proposal for 
clarification of the existing text? Do you think something is missing?

/Miguel

Jesske, R wrote:

> Paul,
> With regard to this feature it must be based on trust relationship as defined within RFC3325 for the P-Asserted-Identity.
> So the indication that this is a authorised user is included by a network entity like it is done for the P-Asserted-Identiy.
> So the network entity knows it via a database that this registered user is a authorised one.
> 
> With regard to the PSTN/ISDN this was solved via a indication that the Calling Party Number is restricted by the network. The network included this indication in three cases:
> 1. The call was originated within a network that cannot provide a originating number (e.G.) analogue.
> 2. The call has no originated number due to interworking with international networks
> 3. The call was send from a authorised user (e.G. police). This indication was then set by the network. This feature is especially used in UK.
> 
> So with the requirement proposed by Miguel we hope to find a solution to cover the 3 above mentioned cases.
> 
> With regard to trust we want to have such a indication bind to a trust relationship as it is described within RFC3325.
> So trust for interconnection to an other network is based on bilateral agreement.
> 
> 
> Best Regards
> 
> Roland
> 
> 
>>-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>>Von: [e-mail] 
>>[mailto:[e-mail]] Im Auftrag von Paul Kyzivat
>>Gesendet: Mittwoch, 24. August 2005 05:07
>>An: Miguel Garcia
>>Cc: [e-mail]; Alexeitsev, Denis
>>Betreff: Re: [Sipping-tispan] TISPAN requirements, first requiements
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>Miguel Garcia wrote:
>>
>>>Folks:
>>>
>>>Since we are tasked to re-draft the TISPAN requirements 
>>
>>adding as much 
>>
>>>clarifications as possible, we would like to start checking 
>>
>>with you if 
>>
>>>the requirements related to the Annonymous Communication 
>>
>>Rejection (ACR) 
>>
>>>service is OK and understandable by everyone.
>>>
>>>So please take a look at the first version of the (much 
>>
>>incomplete and 
>>
>>>short) draft in either text or HTML:
>>>
>>>
>>
>>http://people.nokia.net/~miguel/drafts/pre/draft-jesske-sippin
> 
> g-tispan-requirements-02a.txt 
> 
>>http://people.nokia.net/~miguel/drafts/pre/draft-jesske-sipping-tispan-requirements-02a.html 
>>
>>
>>The document is fairly short at the moment. Please post your comments here.
> 
> 
> Regarding REQ-ACR-2:
> 
> 
>>   REQ-ACR-2: It must be possible that authorized callers are not
>>              subject to the ACR service, thus, allowing the callee to
>>              receive anonymous requests from authorized callers.  This
>>              effectively requires a mechanism to override the ACR
>>              service depending on the identity and authorization of the
>>              caller.  This is needed, e.g., when a police officer or
>>              any other authority is anonymously calling to a user
>>              having the ACR simulation service activated.
> 
> 
> How is a caller authorized? Is the mechanism for determining and 
> conveying this authorization in scope for this service? There is mention 
> specifically of Police Officers, among others, as being authorized. Are 
> there a list of attributes like that which must be used to characterize 
> a caller and that are used to determine the authorization?
> 
> How is this affected by peering and PSTN interconnect? Is an 
> authorization on one side to be conveyed to the other side and then 
> trusted their?
> 
> 	Thanks,
> 	Paul
> 
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> 

-- 
Miguel A. Garcia           tel:[phone]
sip:[e-mail]
Nokia Research Center      Helsinki, Finland


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