Re: [Sipping] WGLC Review: draft-ietf-sipping-capacity-attribute-01.txt

I think the spirit of the text is not to exclude any technology. In 
essence, any technology that is able to cypher SIP messages is suitable 
to protect privacy. We should probably  mention TLS as an example of one 
of such technologies.

/Miguel

Samir Srivastava wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> What is the reason for not considering IPSEC tunnels in the text? DTLS
> is still open issue. So better open-ended text can be phrased like
> 
> "... was sent over a secured channel provided by the underlying layers
> e.g.
> TLS, IPSEC ...."
> 
> How long we want to carry S/MIME with it's deploy ability issues. If
> still we want to use S/MIME atleast known issues with it should be
> listed similar to 3261. Or reference to section of 3261 should be given.
> 
> 
> IMHO, SIP message means REQUEST and RESPONSE both. So the text should be
> well aligned like ".... SIP request unless the SIP request ..." or with
> the "message" word. 
> 
> Thx
> Samir
> 
>> - Section 8, 3rd paragraph, 3rd sentence. "was" -> "is"
>> OLD:
>>    Eavesdroppers are able to watch URI-lists contained in SIP
>>    requests unless the SIP message was sent over a secured channel
> with
>>    Transport Layer Security (TLS) [3] or unless the URI-list body
> itself
>>    is encrypted with S/MIME [8].
>> NEW:
>>    Eavesdroppers are able to watch URI-lists contained in SIP
>>    requests unless the SIP message is sent over a secured channel with
>>    Transport Layer Security (TLS) [3] or unless the URI-list body
> itself
>>    is encrypted with S/MIME [8].
>>
> 

-- 
Miguel A. Garcia           tel:+358-50-4804586
sip:miguel.garcia@neonsite.net
Nokia Research Center      Helsinki, Finland

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