Re: [smartpower-interest] Looking for references/pointers to security research on wireless ad-hoc networks

Greg Daley <gdaley@au.logicalis.com> Wed, 27 April 2011 06:24 UTC

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From: Greg Daley <gdaley@au.logicalis.com>
To: "Akyol, Bora A" <bora@pnnl.gov>, "smartpower-interest@ietf.org" <smartpower-interest@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2011 16:24:25 +1000
Thread-Topic: [smartpower-interest] Looking for references/pointers to security research on wireless ad-hoc networks
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Subject: Re: [smartpower-interest] Looking for references/pointers to security research on wireless ad-hoc networks
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Hi Akyol, 

This sort of issue associated with authorization without a central authority is similar to other works
on peer-to-peer networking, without centralized authentication service.

The question is whether trust has been established previously (and we are recovering based on known 
relationships) or trust has never been present.

In the second case, it may be impossible to establish trust because of the low cost associated with
creation of fake identities on the wireless medium (Even with some sort of agreement protocol, it may
be possible to overwhelm the network using the unfortunately named Sybil attack).

In the first case, it may be possible to establish the identity of a peer by establishing common trust using
common trust relationships (back to a known source, perhaps using Certificates). 

Albeit this may be subject to attacks where the certified identity is compromised, and the existing connectivity
to a CRL or online Certificate validity server (using for example OCSP) is overwhelmed.

Another approach is to provide authentication via existing connected nodes back to the centralized site, but
using protections back to the central server.  I believe this may be covered by an independent submission
that is still being discussed on the (concluded) PANA Working group  mailing list.

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pana/current/maillist.html

Sincerely,

Greg Daley
Consultant
Logicalis Australia Pty Ltd
  	 
E: gdaley@au.logicalis.com
M: +61 401 772 770
P: +61 3 8532 4042
F: +61 3 8532 4032
 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: smartpower-interest-bounces@ietf.org 
> [mailto:smartpower-interest-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of 
> Akyol, Bora A
> Sent: Tuesday, 26 April 2011 2:18 AM
> To: smartpower-interest@ietf.org
> Subject: [smartpower-interest] Looking for 
> references/pointers to security research on wireless ad-hoc networks
> 
> 
> Hi everyone.
> 
> After doing the mandatory literature searches on IEEE, ACM 
> and Google Scholar, I am looking to see if I have missed
> any ongoing work at IETF regarding authorization and 
> authentication of devices or software in wireless ad-hoc 
> networks where
> a centralized entity may not exist. Note that I am not 
> looking for work on routing in MANET or encryption technologies.
> 
> This is related to ongoing smart grid work that I am doing.
> 
> Thank you very much for your help,
> 
> --
> Bora Akyol, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
> +1 509 371 6682, bora@pnnl.gov<mailto:bora@pnnl.gov>, www.pnnl.gov
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