Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm

"Don Johnson" <djohnson@certicom.com> Fri, 26 February 1999 19:25 UTC

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From: Don Johnson <djohnson@certicom.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com>
cc: Bob Jueneman <BJUENEMAN@novell.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org, cme@ACM.ORG, berson@anagram.com, bschanni@BayNetworks.com, kent@bbn.com, pcain@bbn.com, mhetzel@bell-labs.com, brickell@certco.com, djohnson@certicom.ca, schneier@counterpane.com, daw@cs.berkeley.edu, denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu, smid@csmes.ncsl.nist.gov, omura@cylink.com, dickie@EMPIRE.eclipse.ncsc.mil, carlisle.adams@entrust.com, paulv@entrust.com, Blake.greenlee@greenlee.com, benaloh@microsoft.com, bfox@microsoft.com, cjwagne@missi.ncsc.mil, jis@mit.edu, Tolga Acar <TACAR.PRV-7.PROVO@novell.com>, merkle@parc.xerox.com, BSnow@radium.ncsc.mil, burt@RSA.COM, ekr@rtfm.com, jlinn@securitydynamics.com, ams@terisa.com, rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu, balenson@tis.com, denny@tis.com, acc@tycho.ncsc.mil, jhs@tycho.ncsc.mil, smatyas@us.ibm.com, desmedt@uwm.edu
Message-ID: <85256724.006A41E9.00@domino2.certicom.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 14:19:35 -0500
Subject: Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm
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Russ,

Using a random IV for each encryption helps ensure that each block is
encrypted with the same strength, so my previous concerns about weaknesses
at the ends goes away.

Don Johnson





Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> on 02/26/99 12:51:44 PM

To:   "Bob Jueneman" <BJUENEMAN@novell.com>
cc:   ietf-smime@imc.org, cme@ACM.ORG, berson@anagram.com,
      bschanni@BayNetworks.com, kent@bbn.com, pcain@bbn.com,
      mhetzel@bell-labs.com, brickell@certco.com, djohnson@certicom.ca,
      schneier@counterpane.com, daw@cs.berkeley.edu,
      denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu, smid@csmes.ncsl.nist.gov,
      omura@cylink.com, dickie@EMPIRE.eclipse.ncsc.mil,
      carlisle.adams@entrust.com, paulv@entrust.com,
      Blake.greenlee@greenlee.com, benaloh@microsoft.com,
      bfox@microsoft.com, cjwagne@missi.ncsc.mil, jis@mit.edu, "Tolga Acar"
      <TACAR.PRV-7.PROVO@novell.com>, merkle@parc.xerox.com,
      BSnow@radium.ncsc.mil, burt@RSA.COM, ekr@rtfm.com,
      jlinn@securitydynamics.com, ams@terisa.com,
      rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu, balenson@tis.com, denny@tis.com,
      acc@tycho.ncsc.mil, jhs@tycho.ncsc.mil, smatyas@us.ibm.com,
      desmedt@uwm.edu (bcc: Don Johnson/Certicom)
Subject:  Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm




Bob:

You raise an interesting point, but I think it can be easily solved by a
random IV for the first encryption. Of course, this makes the result one
block longer.  And, we would need a different IV for each wrapping.

Russ


At 10:50 AM 2/22/99 -0700, Bob Jueneman wrote:
>Russ,
>
>There is a possible attack on the double encryption wrap algorithm
>that is a result of the constant IV construction. For that reason, I would
>strongly prefer the OAEP construction. Although it may look complicated
>because there are more steps, the number of line of code is really of no
>consequence at all, but the execution time is important for performance.
>
>Also, I continue to insist that we should not invent n-squared algorithm
>IDs for every possible combination of CEK algorithm and key length
>plus KEK algorithm and key length. Instead, I would _greatly_ prefer to
>first wrap the CEK in a ASN.1 structure that defines the CEK algorithm
>and key length, then whiten that structure with OAEP, encrypt the
resulting
>string with the KEK algorithm, and then provide generic instructions as
>to how to decode the result, either by wrapping the entire wrapped key
>blob in ASN.1 (preferably) or some other way.
>
>Here's the attack on the double-encryption wrapping:
>
>Although most exhaustive search engines divide up the search process
>across multiple machines in order to find a single key as quickly as
possible
>(e.g., the series of RSA challenge ciphers), there is another approach
>based on the use of an associative memory that I wrote up back
>in the '70's but never published.  I call it my "vacuum-cleaner" attack.
>
>Assume for the sake or argument that there are lots and lots of keys
>that have been or will be used to encrypt a known plaintext or
>stereotyped message.  (This is a standard assumption in cryptanalysis.)
>Actually, the attack will succeed with a somewhat weaker condition --
>it isn't necessary to actually know the plaintext -- it is sufficient that
>the plaintext be unvarying.
>
>Let's also assume that each key is used for some interesting purpose --
>sufficiently interesting that it may not be necessary to crack each and
every
>key -- just a few would be useful.  For example, if I were trying to carry
on
>a credit card attack, I don't have to find the key for Bill Gates' or
>Donald Trump's credit card -- just about anyone's will do, and the more
>the merrier.
>
>So for every new key that I have the engine try, I contrive to compare
>the result of encrypting the known plaintext against millions of valid
>ciphertexts that have been intercepted, looking for a match.  Assuming
>an effectively inexhaustible supply of ciphertexts is available, this
attack
>multiplies the effectiveness of the key search engine by an order of a
million
>or more, depending on the size of the associative memory that is
available.
>
>(The use of an associative memory isn't essential -- it was just a
gedanken
>experiment to speed up the comparison process without requiring sorting.)
>
>Two things should be noted.  First, this attack is independent of the KEK
>encryption algorithm used, assuming a fixed block size.  In other words,
>this would apply to single-DES, triple-DES, umpty-DES, 2048-bit RSA,
>or whatever, assuming a constant session key and constant padding.
>
>Second, the attack is also independent of the length or type of session
>key that is used, except that the yield is a Birthday Problem function of
the
>length of the key.  But given a fixed input, i.e., no random whitening or
>changing IV, then two or more matching outputs must imply a matching
>session key.
>
>This leads to a rather surprising result -- even if the KEK performs
double
>encryption using triple-DES (or any other algorithm without whitening)
>to wrap a 40 bit key, two matching session keys can be found with
>approximately 50% probability after only 2^20 or a million or so session
>keys have been generated.
>
>Perhaps more surprisingly, at least to people who haven't been down this
path,
>changing session keys more rapidly may hurt more than it helps -- it just
>exposes that many more keys to attack. Changing the session key often
>in the middle of a session may help limit the ability of the attacker to
>access the entire message, and hence limits the attacker's "take," but it
>increases the chances that a potentially interesting fragment of text
>may be exposed.
>
>I'm sure that someone would observe that sending even a million content
>encryption key encrypted in a constant KEK would be extremely unlikely
>in an S/MIME context, but whether that would really be true would require
>a more subtle, protocol-dependent analysis than I would care to make,
>and in addition I very much want to standardize on one key wrapping
>algorithm that is protocol independent, and not just for S/MIME.
>
>Obviously the above attack can be defeated by prepending some
>additional randomness or by changing the IV. But is also what the OAEP
>approach does, and rather more elegantly.  By the time we have to add
>either a changing IV or some additional randomness (how much would be
>required would have to be decided) the length would probably be close
>to that required for OAEP, which is a much more general solution.
>
>In my mind, at least, some extra bytes in the wrapped key is no big deal,
>but I would like the efficiency to be a good as possible. Triple-DES is
>expensive enough in terms of computational efficiency in software,
>especially in terms of the initial key expansion, and doing it twice
>would be worse yet.
>
>Because the new export regulations permit the use of double the key length
>used for data encryption to be used for key encryption, we are going to be
>using triple-DES in encrypt-decrypt-encrypt mode with only two keys
(A-B-A) for
>key wrapping of all export-grade CEK keys.
>
>This can be optimized by saving the key expansion of the first encryption,
and
>then reusing it for the final encryption.  This technique could
potentially be
>extended to the double encryption wrapping algorithm, by saving the key
>expansion used for all three steps, but in order to do that the
>"double-triple-DES"
>algorithm would probably have to be a single algorithm that is invoked --
>it would be quite difficult to securely save state across two separate
>encryption
>operations.
>
>So my preference, as I said earlier, would be to wrap the CEK in ASN.1,
>whiten with OAEP, and then encrypt using whatever KEK algorithm and
>key length is required, so we don't have to keep re-analyzing this problem
>for every new CEK or KEK algorithm or key length.
>
>If we can define appropriate algorithm IDs, I'm willing and eager to adopt
such
>a standard for  _all_ wrapped keys generated and used within our Novell
>International Cryptographic Infrastructure (NICI), even before S/MIME v3
>progresses to a full standard.  I'd be willing to assign an algorithm OID
>from the
>Novell tree, or we could probably get one from PKCS if there would be any
>problem getting one assigned by the IANA.
>
>Regards,
>
>Bob
>
>
>> Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> 02/20/99 02:17PM >>>
>All:
>
>Right now, I am leaning toward the double encryption wrap algorithm.  I
>think it will be easy to implement, and it yeilds a shorter result that
the
>OAEP method.  To convince myself that it was easy to implement, I did an
>implementation.  It took me about two hours while watching an old Jimmy
>Stewart movie.  Of course, I already have SHA-1 and Triple-DES CBC
>routines.  S/MIME v3 will require these algorithms for other capabilities
>besides key wrapping.
>
>If someone else is willing to do an implementation, I would like to
compare
>results.  This will allow a test vector to be included with the algorithm
>description.
>
>Does anyone have any strong objections to the double encryption wrap
>algorithm being selected?
>
>Russ
>
>
>>WRAP ALOGRITHM #1:  DOUBLE ENCRYPTION
>>
>>Key Checksum
>>
>>The CMS Checksum Algorithm is used to provide an content-encryption key
>>integrity check value.  The algorithm is:
>>
>>1.  Compute a 20 octet SHA-1 message digest on the
>>    content-encryption key.
>>2.  Use the most significant (first) eight octets of the
>>    message digest value as the checksum value.
>>
>>Triple-DES Key Wrap
>>
>>1.  Set odd parity for each of the DES key octets comprising
>>    the content-encryption key, call the result CEK.
>>2.  Compute a 8 octet key checksum value on CEK as described above,
>>    call the result ICV.
>>3.  Let CEKICV = CEK || ICV.
>>4.  Encrypt CEKICV in CBC mode using the key-encryption key.  Use
>>    an IV of 0xc302e3c1ad8bb738.
>>5.  Reverse the order of the ciphertext octets.  That is, the most
>>    significant (first) octet is swapped with the least significant
>>    (last) octet, and so on.  Call the result TEMP.
>>6.  Encrypt TEMP in CBC mode using the key-encryption key.  Use
>>    an IV of 0x61a197e5b132e196.  The ciphertext is 32 octets long.
>
>Robert R. Jueneman
>Security Architect
>Network Security Development
>Novell, Inc.
>122 East 1700 South
>Provo, UT 84606
>bjueneman@novell.com
>1-801-861-7387