Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm
"Don Johnson" <djohnson@certicom.com> Mon, 08 February 1999 15:09 UTC
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From: Don Johnson <djohnson@certicom.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com>
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Date: Mon, 08 Feb 1999 10:10:07 -0500
Subject: Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm
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Russ, To be fair, you should explicitly state the security attributes required by the process, that is, if this attribute is not achieved, it should be considered an attack and if a attribute is not mentioned, it is not considered an attack if it is not achieved. For example, confidentiality so that no bit of the key can be guessed with substantially better than 50% probability, detection of alteration with 1/x probability, plaintext awareness, etc. Don Johnson Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> on 02/07/99 04:07:18 PM To: ietf-smime@imc.org cc: burt@RSA.COM, djohnson@certicom.ca, schneier@counterpane.com, denny@tis.com, denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu, omura@cylink.com, mhetzel@bell-labs.com, benaloh@microsoft.com, brickell@certco.com, smatyas@us.ibm.com, paulv@entrust.com, merkle@parc.xerox.com, berson@anagram.com, desmedt@uwm.edu, rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu, carlisle.adams@entrust.com, ams@terisa.com, ekr@rtfm.com, Blake.greenlee@greenlee.com, cme@ACM.ORG, bfox@microsoft.com, acc@tycho.ncsc.mil, bschanni@BayNetworks.com, jhs@tycho.ncsc.mil, jis@mit.edu, pcain@bbn.com, kent@bbn.com, BSnow@radium.ncsc.mil, cjwagne@missi.ncsc.mil, balenson@tis.com, balenson@tis.com, jlinn@securitydynamics.com, smid@csmes.ncsl.nist.gov, daw@cs.berkeley.edu (bcc: Don Johnson/Certicom) Subject: Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm All: After a fair amount of open and public debate, I see three approahces to Triple-DES key wrapping. In this note, I list all three. To keep this note a resonable lenght, I have omitted the unwrap algorithm description. The alternative algorithms are listed in my oreder of preference. The rationale for my ordering is complexity. The simplest is first, and the most complex is last. If the simple wrap algorithm meets the requirements, then what value does the complexity add? The S/MIME v3 specifications will include the selected Triple-DES key wrap algorithm as well as a variant for wrapping RC2 keys (40-128 bit keys). Please review the algorithms. Please do not propose improvements that are covered by any issued or pending patents. Thanks for your assistance, Russ = = = = = = = = = = WRAP ALOGRITHM #1: DOUBLE ENCRYPTION A.1 Key Checksum The CMS Checksum Algorithm is used to provide an content-encryption key integrity check value. The algorithm is: 1. Compute a 20 octet SHA-1 message digest on the content-encryption key. 2. Use the most significant (first) eight octets of the message digest value as the checksum value. A.2 Triple-DES Key Wrap 1. Set odd parity for each of the DES key octets comprising the content-encryption key. 2. Compute a 8 octet key checksum value on the content-encryption key as described above. 3. Concatenate the key checksum value and the content-encryption key. The result is four 8 octet blocks: B1, B2, B3, and B4. 4. Encrypt in CBC mode the four blocks using the key-encryption key. Use an IV of all zeros. 5. Reverse the order of the four ciphertext blocks. The resulting order is B4, B3, B2, and B1. 6. Encrypt the four blocks a second time. Encrypt in CBC mode using the key-encryption key. Use an IV of all zeros. WRAP ALOGRITHM #2: MASK AND ENCRYPT B.1 Key Checksum The CMS Checksum Algorithm is used to provide an content-encryption key integrity check value. The algorithm is: 1. Compute a 20 octet SHA-1 message digest on the content-encryption key. 2. Use the most significant (first) eight octets of the message digest value as the checksum value. B.2 Triple-DES Key Wrap 1. Set odd parity for each of the DES key octets comprising the content-encryption key. 2. Compute a 8 octet key checksum value on the content-encryption key as described above. 3. Generate an 8 octet random number: RAND. 4. Let H1 = SHA-1 ( RAND ). 5. Let H2 = SHA-1 ( H1 ). 6. Let MASK equal the most significant (first) 32 octets of H1 || H2. 7. Let KEYICV equal the content-encryption key concatenated with the key checksum value. 8. Let PLAIN = RAND || ( KEYICV XOR MASK ). 9. Encrypt PLAIN in CBC mode using the key-encryption key. Use an IV of all zeros. WRAP ALOGRITHM #3: OAEP AND ENCRYPT C.1 Key Checksum No explicit ckecksum algoritm is needed. The OAEP processing provides the necessary integrity. C.2 Triple-DES Key Wrap 1. Set odd parity for each of the DES key octets comprising the content-encryption key, called CEK. 2. Let CEKPAD = 0x18 || CEK || 0x0000000000000000000000. 3. Generate a 160-bit random value, called RAND. 4. Let H1 = SHA-1 ( RAND || 0x01 ). 5. Let H2 = SHA-1 ( RAND || 0x02 ). 6. Let MASK1 equal the most significant (first) 36 octets of H1 || H2. 7. Let MKEY = CEKPAD XOR MASK1. 8. Let MASK2 = SHA-1 ( MKEY ). 9. Let MRAND = MASK2 XOR RAND. 10. Let MDATA = MRAND || MKEY. 11. Encrypt MDATA with the key-encryption key and CBC mode. Use an IV with each octet equal to 0xA5. The ciphertext is 56 octets long.
- A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bruce Schneier
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Burt Kaliski
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Dr Stephen Henson
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Carl Ellison
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- RE: Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm bartley.o'malley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm David Wagner
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Carl Ellison
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Snow, Brian D.
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm David Wagner
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Stephen Kent
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Burt Kaliski
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Burt Kaliski
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Jim Schaad (Exchange)
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm EKR
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Section Russ Housley
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Paul Van Oorschot
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Kevin Kingdon
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Burt Kaliski
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Tolga Acar