Re: [solace] Slides posted for SAAG heads-up

[Rene Struik <[e-mail]>]

_Dear colleagues:
_

_
_

_What about starting with the following use case scenario, which was one 
of the scenarios brought up by user community (Shell, in this case) in 
industrial control network setting?
_

_
_

_Scenario 1:_

·Plant X wants to install a wireless sensor network to measure 5 
pressure and 5 temperature points. One gateway. That gateway to connect 
to the legacy wired infrastructure. Plant X now has a DCS system with an 
Ethernet L2 network. Plant X likes to buy pressure instruments from 
vendor A, and temperature instruments from B. Gateways for G.

·Plant X uses contractor C for installation and commissioning.

Scenario 1b would now include realization that contractor C turns out 
not to be that trust worthy and threatens to throw installation info on 
the street, unless a $1m amount is being paid to an offshore account.



I believe this should not be "too theoretical" (??).


Rene

On 11/7/2012 5:10 PM, Robert Cragie wrote:
>
> On 07/11/2012 9:38 PM, Carsten Bormann wrote:
>> Hi Rene,
>>
>> good to hear from you.
>>
>> Clearly, we cannot stop at exactly one usage scenario.
>> But I strongly believe we need to start with exactly one.
>> When we have the contributions for that, we can probably ask much 
>> better questions for the next round, where we will add scenarios.
> +1. The premise for an effective usage scenario is that it is fully or 
> at least well understood otherwise it is not a usage scenario. It is 
> all very well theorising on a multitude of usage scenarios and saying 
> they are all important but unless they are proven to be relevant and 
> the particular issues are understodd, they lose their relevance as a 
> usage scenario.
>>
>> The slides are indeed more for SAAG and less for people who would 
>> focus on the logistics of rolling out 50000000000 devices.
>> SOLACE clearly goes beyond security, or we could do it right there in 
>> the security area.
> +1.
>>
>> The security objectives slides are divided into one for the specific 
>> ones for a scenario and one for the general ones (one could say 
>> "motherhood and apple pie" if they were better understood).  Even if 
>> the specific ones can be toned down, we still have the general ones, 
>> and that includes avoiding susceptibility to mass attacks.  (This is 
>> one of the points that were made at the March SoS workshop.)  And 
>> that is, very much, the reason why compromising on security always 
>> leads to security compromises.
>>
>> Grüße, Carsten
>>
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