Re: [solace] Slides posted for SAAG heads-up

[Rene Struik <[e-mail]>]

Hi Carsten:

If this sounds too easy, just because I put the word "industrial 
control" in the title, please abstract this a little bit and apply other 
nomenclature. If it is still too easy, then just provide a good 
description and a proposed approach and collect your price money. Then, 
we can move on to what you believe would be more difficult. I do claim 
that the scenario I described captures lots of aspects that are 
necessary to get to anything meaningful for internet of things 
scenarios. Not everything is a home scenario (plus: if all networks are 
home-size with debt-laden households, one never gets to the 50billion 
device numbers. Moreover, we also do not harness the power of wireless 
to assist in addressing huge societal problems).

What scenario do you suggest yourself: more than hub-and-spoke, all 
shrink-wrapped, I hope?

Rene

------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	Re: [solace] Slides posted for SAAG heads-up
Date: 	Wed, 7 Nov 2012 18:36:26 -0500
From: 	Carsten Bormann <[e-mail]>
To: 	Rene Struik <[e-mail]>
CC: 	[e-mail], [e-mail]



On Nov 7, 2012, at 18:29, Rene Struik <[e-mail]> wrote:

> industrial control

Too easy.

This is usually a highly controlled environment, where there already are defined business relationships.

Try a home occupied with a family with a 13-year old son, where the lifecycle later involves, say, a divorce and a foreclosure.

(I like the industrial scenario, but I think we should do that later.)

Grüße, Carsten



On 11/7/2012 6:29 PM, Rene Struik wrote:
>
> _Dear colleagues:
> _
>
> _
> _
>
> _What about starting with the following use case scenario, which was 
> one of the scenarios brought up by user community (Shell, in this 
> case) in industrial control network setting?
> _
>
> _
> _
>
> _Scenario 1:_
>
> ·Plant X wants to install a wireless sensor network to measure 5 
> pressure and 5 temperature points. One gateway. That gateway to 
> connect to the legacy wired infrastructure. Plant X now has a DCS 
> system with an Ethernet L2 network. Plant X likes to buy pressure 
> instruments from vendor A, and temperature instruments from B. 
> Gateways for G.
>
> ·Plant X uses contractor C for installation and commissioning.
>
> Scenario 1b would now include realization that contractor C turns out 
> not to be that trust worthy and threatens to throw installation info 
> on the street, unless a $1m amount is being paid to an offshore account.
>
>
>
> I believe this should not be "too theoretical" (??).
>
>
> Rene
>
> On 11/7/2012 5:10 PM, Robert Cragie wrote:
>>
>> On 07/11/2012 9:38 PM, Carsten Bormann wrote:
>>> Hi Rene,
>>>
>>> good to hear from you.
>>>
>>> Clearly, we cannot stop at exactly one usage scenario.
>>> But I strongly believe we need to start with exactly one.
>>> When we have the contributions for that, we can probably ask much 
>>> better questions for the next round, where we will add scenarios.
>> +1. The premise for an effective usage scenario is that it is fully 
>> or at least well understood otherwise it is not a usage scenario. It 
>> is all very well theorising on a multitude of usage scenarios and 
>> saying they are all important but unless they are proven to be 
>> relevant and the particular issues are understodd, they lose their 
>> relevance as a usage scenario.
>>>
>>> The slides are indeed more for SAAG and less for people who would 
>>> focus on the logistics of rolling out 50000000000 devices.
>>> SOLACE clearly goes beyond security, or we could do it right there 
>>> in the security area.
>> +1.
>>>
>>> The security objectives slides are divided into one for the specific 
>>> ones for a scenario and one for the general ones (one could say 
>>> "motherhood and apple pie" if they were better understood).  Even if 
>>> the specific ones can be toned down, we still have the general ones, 
>>> and that includes avoiding susceptibility to mass attacks.  (This is 
>>> one of the points that were made at the March SoS workshop.)  And 
>>> that is, very much, the reason why compromising on security always 
>>> leads to security compromises.
>>>
>>> Grüße, Carsten
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> solace mailing list
>>> [e-mail]
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/solace
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
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