[Hipsec-rg] Re: Native HIP API questions in the hipsec-rg meeting

touch@ISI.EDU (Joe Touch) Sat, 21 August 2004 12:35 UTC

From: touch@ISI.EDU (Joe Touch)
Date: Sat Aug 21 12:35:03 2004
Subject: [Hipsec-rg] Re: Native HIP API questions in the hipsec-rg meeting
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.4.58.0408200959460.3500@kekkonen.cs.hut.fi>
References: <6938661A6EDA8A4EA8D1419BCE46F24C04060809@xch-nw-27.nw.nos.boeing.com> <41252460.5040509@isi.edu> <Pine.GSO.4.58.0408200959460.3500@kekkonen.cs.hut.fi>
Message-ID: <41260CBB.90200@isi.edu>

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Miika Komu wrote:

> On Thu, 19 Aug 2004, Joe Touch wrote:
> 
> 
>>We already have a DNS which provides a global resolution structure. What
>>is the gain in having a global ID space?
>>
>>Far as I can tell, you need the DNS (or a copy that's just as
>>complicated and global) to give you the rendezvous points. If the dest
>>IS the rendezvous point, you're done. Why bother putting the ID in the
>>DNS and ensuring that it's global?
> 
> 
> If you don't know the ID of the peer before connection establishment, it
> is called "HIP opportunistic mode". A hostile host can DoS the peer and
> pretend to be the peer for you.
> 
> On the other hand, you can detect that another host has replaced the real
> peer if you can first lookup the ID of the peer from the DNS.

A hostile host can just lookup the host it wants to impersonate and use 
its HIP ID anyway. If you go to the DNS, presumably the entry there was 
signed - if you need to validate that the endpoint is who the DNS says 
it was, you MUST use the same signing authority as validation anyway; 
the HIP ID doesn't add any information.

Joe

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