Re: [lamps] Revocation Request Format?

[Russ Housley <[e-mail]>]

> On Mar 2, 2018, at 4:19 PM, Ryan Sleevi <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 3:17 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> If it is a signing key, just sign a CRL for the certificate. Now that is not quite the same as revoking the key but certs are the only things PKIX makes status assertions about.
> 
> Do we have to support self-revocation of certs with only encryption only keys? Probably not.
> 
> Since a very common reason for having to revoke a cert is that the private key is lost entirely any revocation format cannot be the only way to request revocation. So I don't see the relevance of the robot attack.
> 
> Because it's a demonstration of compromise. Any attempt to define how that demonstration of compromise is proved (which I think is *bad* standardization) is to make it more difficult to report or demonstrate compromise.

When we had a similar discussion many years ago, the feeling was somewhat different.  If someone has assess to the private key and uses it to authenticate a revocation request, the CA should honor it.  Since the party clearly has access to the private key, thee are many things that party could do that are more harmful than revoking the associated certificate.

Russ