IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [lamps] New drafts available - non-composite hybrid authentication, and binding certs

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 05 April 2022 15:08 UTC

Return-Path: <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
X-Original-To: spasm@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: spasm@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B8BF3A0A8C for <spasm@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 08:08:44 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.108
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.108 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=sandelman.ca
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id b_Ew5fzE2skW for <spasm@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 08:08:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca (tuna.sandelman.ca [209.87.249.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 553343A09EE for <spasm@ietf.org>; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 08:08:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id C366E38B11; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 11:19:43 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with LMTP id 53aUdU2bcJXQ; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 11:19:42 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from sandelman.ca (obiwan.sandelman.ca [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:2::247]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA16138AFF; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 11:19:42 -0400 (EDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=sandelman.ca; s=mail; t=1649171982; bh=MFsOxQvlLpXMqCtmILVmVwxldhySDic2oqoEXmwCAGQ=; h=From:To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date:From; b=ztDknuCXU6TuP5i7Q2+sZ3873QyZvBcfhbtbkvDD4KsR7YLhlg76eVsRBwuX7VrXz dj1CfXS93+c2vfMZfz0C+/25ZGXUh1P8zzK/wtJGvXA9Jk1Qhzk7FhHBho5TeHhtCt OwE8f2DRyIFF12tCKsSLPuos+uzmh0P9O2DqBwvMoDs8lFO3w0M47ks3hL444vrFH5 la/5BRiWryr3cu4Uf+P9ehKhFtvoMb/ds+NV9zURnbVzDdOXVw5AQoqtKGzhrPwx/B QyZOw6XtzZ/oF3Yw9g/18Qfafht9YNVHu7V4Tl9YzLpHdSHOVUz6pDYoDUBTly/AUh PkPNlD/9FfajQ==
Received: from localhost (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8623D12D; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 11:08:34 -0400 (EDT)
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: "aebecke\@uwe.nsa.gov" <aebecke@uwe.nsa.gov>, "spasm\@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <SA0PR09MB7241BE7254D79F342076EDAFF1E59@SA0PR09MB7241.namprd09.prod.outlook.com>
References: <SA0PR09MB7241BE7254D79F342076EDAFF1E59@SA0PR09MB7241.namprd09.prod.outlook.com>
X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6+git; nmh 1.7+dev; GNU Emacs 26.1
X-Face: $\n1pF)h^`}$H>Hk{L"x@)JS7<%Az}5RyS@k9X%29-lHB$Ti.V>2bi.~ehC0; <'$9xN5Ub# z!G,p`nR&p7Fz@^UXIn156S8.~^@MJ*mMsD7=QFeq%AL4m<nPbLgmtKK-5dC@#:k
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Date: Tue, 05 Apr 2022 11:08:34 -0400
Message-ID: <25039.1649171314@localhost>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/AMn2kwxVJcok_K7524_c2BPOprA>
Subject: Re: [lamps] New drafts available - non-composite hybrid authentication, and binding certs
X-BeenThere: spasm@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is a venue for discussion of doing Some Pkix And SMime \(spasm\) work." <spasm.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/spasm>, <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/>
List-Post: <mailto:spasm@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm>, <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 05 Apr 2022 15:08:45 -0000

aebecke@uwe.nsa.gov <aebecke@uwe.nsa.gov> wrote:
    > The use case may not be limited to only PQ certificates, but it is the
    > main motivation of this work. It may support the scenarios you've
    > described, but that is really an off-label benefit and not the intended
    > use.

Yes, I understand, but if it provides an immediate ROI then it will get the
new code paths and new error situations tested sooner, and I think that has
value.

    > Regarding policies- this extension could be useful in a number of
    > protocols and potentially for various use cases, since it is really a
    > tool to facilitate with certificate ownership assertion. Because of
    > that, we may want to refrain from making too many normative statements
    > about policy, because we anticipate that policy surrounding this
    > extension may not be uniform, even for the single use case we specify.

If the policy is non-uniform, then that makes specifying the policies even
more important.

It's not enough to present a sad-face emoji to an end user, and give them
nothing useful communicate to/through their support mechanisms.


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

v2.8.7 | Report a Bug | By Email