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Re: [lamps] New drafts available - non-composite hybrid authentication, and binding certs

"Kampanakis, Panos" <kpanos@amazon.com> Wed, 23 March 2022 16:43 UTC

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Thread-Topic: [lamps] New drafts available - non-composite hybrid authentication, and binding certs
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From: "Kampanakis, Panos" <kpanos@amazon.com>
To: "aebecke@uwe.nsa.gov" <aebecke=40uwe.nsa.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
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Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 16:42:32 +0000
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Subject: Re: [lamps] New drafts available - non-composite hybrid authentication, and binding certs
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Thx for the drafts Alie.

Regarding draft-becker-guthrie-noncomposite-hybrid-auth<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-becker-guthrie-noncomposite-hybrid-auth/> , I guess the advantage of the approach seems to be that if you don't trust the PQ signature yet, you won't have to migrate twice, once with a composite algorithm cert and later with a pure PQ one.

I have to point out some disadvantages though compared to the PQ-composite option
- there is redundancy in the cert data sent over the wire in the PQ-hybrid case.
- the onus is pushed to the transport protocol which now has to do much more than support a new OID. Introducing two OIDs and two PKIs is the PQ-composite option. Not sure how to quantify which is more work.
- there is more complexity in tying the two identities together by using the new extension.

Imo the discussion becomes what do we consider easier and better to deploy and use, PQ-composite or PQ-noncomposite-hybrid.

Rgs,
Panos



From: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of aebecke@uwe.nsa.gov
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2022 2:17 PM
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Subject: [EXTERNAL] [lamps] New drafts available - non-composite hybrid authentication, and binding certs


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Hi LAMPS,

  Two new drafts related to PQ migration are available here (note- these drafts are an update to the talk we gave at IETF112 in November) : https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-becker-guthrie-cert-binding-for-multi-auth/ and https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-becker-guthrie-noncomposite-hybrid-auth/


The noncomposite-hybrid-auth-00 draft is an informational draft that gives a general overview of hybrid authentication, and details the solution space of what we are calling non-composite type hybrid solutions for authentication.

The cert-binding-for-multi-auth-00 draft defines a new CSR attribute, bindingRequest, and a new X.509 certificate extension, BoundCertificates, which together provide additional assurance that multiple certificates (used in non-composite hybrid authentication) each belong to the same end entity.

  Please feel free to provide any comments and feedback!

  Regards,
  Alie Becker + coauthors Rebecca Guthrie, Mike Jenkins

  ----
  Alison Becker, PhD
  Center for Cybersecurity Standards
  National Security Agency

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