Re: [lamps] New draft: rfc6844bis

[Ryan Sleevi <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 3:49 AM, Quirin Scheitle <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> 3) Validation Type   ######################
>
> We suggest a tag (i.e., not a parameter) to permit domain-level control of
> permitted/restricted validation methods. E.g., an entry such as
>
>   tum.de 0 CAA 128 dcv "dns-cname"
>   tum.de 0 CAA 128 dcv "domain-contact-postal"
>
> would permit dns-cname and domain-contact-postal methods. An entry such as
>
>   tum.de 0 CAA 128 nodcv "tls-sni”
>
> would restrict the tls-sni method, but permit all others.
> A mapping of BR/ACME defined methods to usable names would have to be
> conceived.
> This could have helped in the TLS-SNI problem a couple of months ago.


> 4) Validation Level    ######################
>
> We suggest a tag to define a minimum validation level. E.g.,
>         tum.de 0 CAA 128 vlevel "ov"
> In this example, the validation level tag vlevel would specify
> that for tum.de, only OV or EV certificates may be issued.
> This could, e.g. be used by domain name holders that exclusively
> obtain EV certificates, such as financial institutions,
> to proactively close the attack surface of DV methods.
>

I am not supportive of either of these as part of 6844-bis.

Both of these concepts are specific to a particular industry and set of
policies (namely, the commercial Web PKI and the CA/Browser Forum
documents), and as such, do not have normative references and are not
standards themselves that can be referenced.

I am supportive of the former, to be defined in the CA/Browser Forum. While
this document might countenance syntax of such an expression, the semantics
of such an expression is inherently tied to the CA/Browser Forum's
validation requirements, and thus exclusively should be viewed in that lens.

I am not supportive of the latter, even in the CA/Browser Forum, as they're
unnecessary expressions of syntax for what can already be achieved via
policy. That is, by restricting the set of CAs that can issue, one can
already restrict the type and nature of certificates issued. For nominal
views of 'high' security, this is the only defensible position - as shown
by the ample OV and EV misissuance of CAs.