Re: [lamps] Spencer Dawkins' No Objection on charter-ietf-lamps-02-00: (with COMMENT)

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Wed, 23 May 2018 20:10 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Wed, 23 May 2018 16:01:13 -0400
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] Spencer Dawkins' No Objection on charter-ietf-lamps-02-00: (with COMMENT)
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> On May 23, 2018, at 3:40 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
>>   My understanding is that the intention is "near-term from now." The idea 
>    is that LAMPS should develop something that you could use, say, next 
>    year to encrypt email you send so that, 15 years from now when someone 
>    finally builds a 4,000 qubit machine, they can't dig out your (then) 
>    14-year-old email and decrypt it.
> 
> Kenny Paterson gave a talk at a recent IETF where he said, basically, that the IETF should wait until NIST is done with their post-quantum evaluation/competition.  Are we sure we want to disagree with him?  Or is it just because digest-based signatures are well-understood that we're willing to do so.

Rich:

That is not quite what he said.  Kenny said that we should not adopt a post-quantum secure algorithm.  Kenny did not say we should not find ways to use pre-shared secrets to bolster the security of the techniques we are already using.

Another example where we are mixing the pre-shared secret is draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2.

Russ