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[lamps] Re: TLS Client Certificates; a survey

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Mon, 23 March 2026 18:01 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Tls <tls@ietf.org>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
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Subject: [lamps] Re: TLS Client Certificates; a survey
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Salz, Rich <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
      > Since WebPKI CA’s will not be able to issue TLS-Client certificates,
      > what are the customers and CAs thinking of doing?

You say this as if it's a new thing :-)
Is it the "change" that certificates obtained for code signing or email use
will have the tls-kp-clientAuth EKU ommitted?

    > Replies to be will be summarized to both lists. Please be careful if
    > you use reply-all.

1. This assumes the RP are checking EKU.
2. I think 94% of usage of mTLS is via private PKI for the client side.

It would be nice to find a way to resurrect subordinate enterprise PKI.
I have some ideas, but I don't work for a WebPKI.
(Change that if you like)


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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