Re: [lamps] Mirja Kühlewind's No Objection on draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-05: (with COMMENT)

[Russ Housley <[e-mail]>]

Mirja:

> Why is the intended status informational? Unfortunately, this is not further
> explained in the shepherd write-up. What was the discussion in the group and
> why was informational selected? As this doc defines a protocol extension,
> informational does not seem appropriate for me. Should it be experimental
> instead?

This document was originally expected to be published on the Independent Stream, but the Security Area Director at the time asked the ISE to send the document to the LAMPS WG. Since it was already submitted to the Independent Stream for publication as Informational RFC, the topic never came up about a different publication status.

The LAMPS WG discussion started here: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/o7aDwt5VMXCyL5UeLHrZxrdQjaA <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/o7aDwt5VMXCyL5UeLHrZxrdQjaA>

> Quick question/comment: The document mentions two “error” cases where a new
> self-signed certificate needs to be deployed. If that is an option that always
> need to be taken into account, the benefits of this mechanism are less clear to
> me. What is the exact attack scenarios this mechanism tries to protect?

Deploying a new self-signed certificate is a much more complex task.  While this is the fallback situation if things go wrong, the deployment of replacement self-signed certificate is much simpler when things work.

Russ