[lamps] Re: [TLS] Re: TLS Client Certificates; a survey

Raghu Saxena <poiasd@saxrag.com> Tue, 24 March 2026 11:04 UTC

Return-Path: <poiasd@saxrag.com>
X-Original-To: spasm@mail2.ietf.org
Delivered-To: spasm@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E104FD09706A; Tue, 24 Mar 2026 04:04:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at ietf.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.098
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_CERTIFIED_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=saxrag.com
Received: from mail2.ietf.org ([166.84.6.31]) by localhost (mail2.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 40ctDGC0EIca; Tue, 24 Mar 2026 04:04:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.saxrag.com (mail.saxrag.com [51.75.207.79]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6AEA9D097057; Tue, 24 Mar 2026 04:04:08 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=saxrag.com; s=default; t=1774350247; bh=r3ckd4JJ3cXBDQ+jsE66Llkk1GQXIByXwjNe4ZSs8Kc=; h=Date:To:References:From:Subject:In-Reply-To:From; b=ZQC4TEQDGnVFI3dEWnl0C1+vlGPYMfgjxSh3s5JjRzeR/pdTOWj1PbT4ohs580SCH JcJ3j2vSbQzDFRG1hFmQDLCyFWla4Mib/fJAdKiNsIs077DygRxj7GNQBxF/kL8Jal vOMlRHrZMJM2jNwG2AorK49TkIrXIh0Srt1PWweESsdIUykZHjoMNUXm2jcaO33xwn Rr0UqGEOleCFAtm4O8mzD7V+z50hj7sQ0Zn2WG4UkUd3BIi8neK8p9DoqeYg3OQrBV lu8LrCLfYlkdeGnnctFGOd9/iibB9ZjmdEnqYXnkmX0+fZHtInsmD07lCBgdLjZ3yp wHdmP4K8KdTeQ==
Message-ID: <44921da9-5386-448b-95c2-1b4350995e6b@saxrag.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2026 19:03:56 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001=40cs.auckland.ac.nz@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Tls <tls@ietf.org>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
References: <MN2PR17MB40314193002D42E6ED4F465ACD4CA@MN2PR17MB4031.namprd17.prod.outlook.com> <b4f72332-6987-46f0-9021-afa414f7b571@saxrag.com> <MEAPR01MB36542337E73DDE824DA12901EE48A@MEAPR01MB3654.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com>
Content-Language: en-US
From: Raghu Saxena <poiasd@saxrag.com>
In-Reply-To: <MEAPR01MB36542337E73DDE824DA12901EE48A@MEAPR01MB3654.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com>
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg="pgp-sha256"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="------------sji7lYU5dUPRUOhKNxmMdeIC"
Message-ID-Hash: 6WASBAUIDSYHC72Q6KBGZD7RKPOFBKWU
X-Message-ID-Hash: 6WASBAUIDSYHC72Q6KBGZD7RKPOFBKWU
X-MailFrom: poiasd@saxrag.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-spasm.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [lamps] Re: [TLS] Re: TLS Client Certificates; a survey
List-Id: This is the mail list for the LAMPS Working Group <spasm.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/TlQMc275VpKRfNPIirb1ksk1Yhc>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm>
List-Help: <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:spasm-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:spasm@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:spasm-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:spasm-leave@ietf.org>

Dear Peter,

On 3/24/26 4:11 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Just out of interest, is the trusted cert set now union( X9_root,
> every_CA_in_existence ) or is the X9 root siloed off?
Currently it is indeed unioned
> Once you've set up your
> trusted CA system, always check whether a random cert from GoDaddy can get in
> just as easily as one from the trusted CA.  Or to put it another way, unless
> it's the free-for-all of web PKI use never use the system's trusted cert
> store when security really matters.

That's a good point. Right now some other integrations require more 
traditional CA signed certs, but ideally when setting up the TLS 
connection I'd whitelist the approved CAs rather than just use the 
system trust with X9 patched in.

- Raghu