IETF Logo Mail Archive

[lamps] header-protection test vectors: should they include intermediate CA?

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Thu, 27 May 2021 22:00 UTC

Return-Path: <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
X-Original-To: spasm@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: spasm@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD2983A1506 for <spasm@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 27 May 2021 15:00:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.305
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.305 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED=0.001, RDNS_NONE=0.793, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=neutral reason="invalid (unsupported algorithm ed25519-sha256)" header.d=fifthhorseman.net header.b=2UenChEA; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=fifthhorseman.net header.b=clysMNFW
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GAWxBGXboKA1 for <spasm@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 27 May 2021 15:00:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from che.mayfirst.org (unknown [162.247.75.117]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DB7573A1503 for <spasm@ietf.org>; Thu, 27 May 2021 15:00:34 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=fifthhorseman.net; i=@fifthhorseman.net; q=dns/txt; s=2019; t=1622152831; h=from : to : subject : date : message-id : mime-version : content-type : from; bh=SBAN+3u8cU+5EI+m5wupqXchqEnbx0Yov+vrUrEAlOo=; b=2UenChEAkuo+mc4rcE7ourThKNDexep/moGeGg7d0KeKt8eBYCoIiL5YW4W3rHikTU9Lc ryfGRvv59xiuCEkCQ==
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=fifthhorseman.net; i=@fifthhorseman.net; q=dns/txt; s=2019rsa; t=1622152831; h=from : to : subject : date : message-id : mime-version : content-type : from; bh=SBAN+3u8cU+5EI+m5wupqXchqEnbx0Yov+vrUrEAlOo=; b=clysMNFW5H/HQfEM0zQXCo2s/tWoeLf7G4QL1humxAeE85NrNanpuXqJxu7ArtHdYaFKJ ZwKlfxjWbrkCheZK3o0ES3tK3C80jBsiwgb8HHl/XpIHqsYbHBldFeKJy/bnE0Kyl6i8YnO YyfOusUHQForjlTOPuzfYF7drUH3SD+h0ECVQupAYD+bJ4kVYqlCQDmN8+hxeueMoDyez/1 sdIXbJ5F73YUB5JRq9dA2SLx7+eSnWqmM/SwUWqm0m6y98HXO2DFiyi52Z145yhCi+rESwU lO/WE4xvJPtLwg5aC5g8dfrr6wChavxSajQxTSZ4YVKlqWFDlvam4WZTru4Q==
Received: from fifthhorseman.net (lair.fifthhorseman.net [108.58.6.98]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by che.mayfirst.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D7FE5F9A5 for <spasm@ietf.org>; Thu, 27 May 2021 18:00:30 -0400 (EDT)
Received: by fifthhorseman.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 2919F204CB; Thu, 27 May 2021 18:00:27 -0400 (EDT)
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>
Autocrypt: addr=dkg@fifthhorseman.net; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mDMEX+i03xYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdACA4xvL/xI5dHedcnkfViyq84doe8zFRid9jW7CC9XBiI0QQf FgoAgwWCX+i03wWJBZ+mAAMLCQcJEOCS6zpcoQ26RxQAAAAAAB4AIHNhbHRAbm90YXRpb25zLnNl cXVvaWEtcGdwLm9yZ/tr8E9NA10HvcAVlSxnox6z62KXCInWjZaiBIlgX6O5AxUKCAKbAQIeARYh BMKfigwB81402BaqXOCS6zpcoQ26AADZHQD/Zx9nc3N2kj13AUsKMr/7zekBtgfSIGB3hRCU74Su G44A/34Yp6IAkndewLxb1WdRSokycnaCVyrk0nb4imeAYyoPtBc8ZGtnQGZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4u bmV0PojRBBMWCgCDBYJf6LTfBYkFn6YAAwsJBwkQ4JLrOlyhDbpHFAAAAAAAHgAgc2FsdEBub3Rh dGlvbnMuc2VxdW9pYS1wZ3Aub3JnL0Gwxvypz2tu1IPG+yu1zPjkiZwpscsitwrVvzN3bbADFQoI ApsBAh4BFiEEwp+KDAHzXjTYFqpc4JLrOlyhDboAAPkXAP0Z29z7jW+YzLzPTQML4EQLMbkHOfU4 +s+ki81Czt0WqgD/SJ8RyrqDCtEP8+E4ZSR01ysKqh+MUAsTaJlzZjehiQ24MwRf6LTfFgkrBgEE AdpHDwEBB0DkKHOW2kmqfAK461+acQ49gc2Z6VoXMChRqobGP0ubb4kBiAQYFgoBOgWCX+i03wWJ BZ+mAAkQ4JLrOlyhDbpHFAAAAAAAHgAgc2FsdEBub3RhdGlvbnMuc2VxdW9pYS1wZ3Aub3Jnfvo+ nHoxDwaLaJD8XZuXiaqBNZtIGXIypF1udBBRoc0CmwICHgG+oAQZFgoAbwWCX+i03wkQPp1xc3He VlxHFAAAAAAAHgAgc2FsdEBub3RhdGlvbnMuc2VxdW9pYS1wZ3Aub3JnaheiqE7Pfi3Atb3GGTw+ jFcBGOaobgzEJrhEuFpXREEWIQQttUkcnfDcj0MoY88+nXFzcd5WXAAAvrsBAIJ5sBg8Udocv25N stN/zWOiYpnjjvOjVMLH4fV3pWE1AP9T6hzHz7hRnAA8d01vqoxOlQ3O6cb/kFYAjqx3oMXSBhYh BMKfigwB81402BaqXOCS6zpcoQ26AADX7gD/b83VObe14xrNP8xcltRrBZF5OE1rQSPkMNy+eWpk eCwA/1hxiS8ZxL5/elNjXiWuHXEvUGnRoVj745Vl48sZPVYMuDgEX+i03xIKKwYBBAGXVQEFAQEH QIGex1WZbH6xhUBve5mblScGYU+Y8QJOomXH+rr5tMsMAwEICYjJBBgWCgB7BYJf6LTfBYkFn6YA CRDgkus6XKENukcUAAAAAAAeACBzYWx0QG5vdGF0aW9ucy5zZXF1b2lhLXBncC5vcmcEAx9vTD3b J0SXkhvcRcCr6uIDJwic3KFKxkH1m4QW0QKbDAIeARYhBMKfigwB81402BaqXOCS6zpcoQ26AAAX mwD8CWmukxwskU82RZLMk5fm1wCgMB5z8dA50KLw3rgsCykBAKg1w/Y7XpBS3SlXEegIg1K1e6dR fRxL7Z37WZXoH8AH
Date: Thu, 27 May 2021 18:00:26 -0400
Message-ID: <87r1hrj0qt.fsf@fifthhorseman.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg="pgp-sha256"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/bioqY841tFSSudU2CDQvNWHwTk8>
Subject: [lamps] header-protection test vectors: should they include intermediate CA?
X-BeenThere: spasm@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is a venue for discussion of doing Some Pkix And SMime \(spasm\) work." <spasm.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/spasm>, <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/>
List-Post: <mailto:spasm@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm>, <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 27 May 2021 22:00:40 -0000

Hey LAMPS folks--

An open question about the test vectors for
draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection:

The sample messages all include the signer's signing certificate and
encryption certificate.  They do *not* include the issuing authority's
root certificate (ca.rsa.crt) or the cross-signed cert
(ca.rsa.cross.crt) that would allow the end-entity certificates to be
validated by an different authority.

I don't think it makes any sense to include ca.rsa.crt in the messages
-- if the peer doesn't know about that certificate already, then it
won't trust it.  But ca.rsa.cross.crt is potentially useful for building
a path to a different known, trusted root.

This is similar in some sense to the question about what CA
certificate(s) to include in the PKCS#12 objects from
draft-ietf-lamps-samples, but now i'm asking it about PKCS#7 CMS blobs.

In draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-04, no intermediate certificates
are included in the PKCS#7.

I'm considering adding ca.rsa.cross.crt to the PKCS#7 blobs for -05.

This will increase the size of the draft but not the complexity of it.
Any objections to this proposal?  Any counterproposals?

   --dkg

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email