[lamps] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-10: (with COMMENT)
Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Mon, 02 July 2018 20:52 UTC
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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 13:52:37 -0700
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Subject: [lamps] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-10: (with COMMENT)
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Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-10: Yes When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks to everyone who put work into updating this document. I have one comment that is either substantive or me just being confused, and several editorial nits. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- §3.5.3.2: > The values to be placed in the micalg parameter SHOULD be from the > following: > > Algorithm Value Used > MD5 md5 > SHA-1 sha-1 > SHA-224 sha-224 > SHA-256 sha-256 > SHA-384 sha-384 > SHA-512 sha-512 > Any other (defined separately in algorithm profile or "unknown" if > not defined) The example then goes on to demonstrate the use of "micalg=sha-1". This is probably a misunderstanding on my part, but I thought that this document was intending to mark MD5 and SHA-1 as historic for digesting content (cf. §1.7 and §B.1). Wouldn't that mean they should be annotated as deprecated in some way here? I would have also expected the example to use sha-256 or sha-512. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- §2.2: > - . SHOULD support RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256. There appears to be an extra "." at the beginning of this bullet --------------------------------------------------------------------------- §3.1: > S/MIME is used to secure MIME entities. A MIME message is composed > of a MIME header and a MIME body, the body can consist of a single > part or of multiple parts. Nit: "...MIME body. The body can..." --------------------------------------------------------------------------- §3.3: > The > Enveloped-Only structure does not support authenticated symmetric > algorithms, use the .Authenticated Enveloped structure for these > algorithms. Two nits: "...symmetric algorithms. Use the Authenticated..." ^ ^ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- §6: > S/MIME implementations almost universally use ephemeral-static rather > than static-static key agreement and do not use a shared secret for > encryption, this means that the first precondition is not met. Nit: "...encryption. This means..."