[lamps] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-10: (with COMMENT)

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Mon, 02 July 2018 20:52 UTC

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Subject: [lamps] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-10: (with COMMENT)
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Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-10: Yes

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks to everyone who put work into updating this document. I have one comment
that is either substantive or me just being confused, and several editorial
nits.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§3.5.3.2:

>  The values to be placed in the micalg parameter SHOULD be from the
>  following:
>
>   Algorithm Value Used
>   MD5       md5
>   SHA-1     sha-1
>   SHA-224   sha-224
>   SHA-256   sha-256
>   SHA-384   sha-384
>   SHA-512   sha-512
>   Any other (defined separately in algorithm profile or "unknown" if
>             not defined)

The example then goes on to demonstrate the use of "micalg=sha-1".  This is
probably a misunderstanding on my part, but I thought that this document was
intending to mark MD5 and SHA-1 as historic for digesting content (cf. §1.7
and §B.1). Wouldn't that mean they should be annotated as deprecated in some
way here? I would have also expected the example to use sha-256 or sha-512.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§2.2:

>  -  .  SHOULD support RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256.

There appears to be an extra "." at the beginning of this bullet

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§3.1:

>  S/MIME is used to secure MIME entities.  A MIME message is composed
>  of a MIME header and a MIME body, the body can consist of a single
>  part or of multiple parts.

Nit: "...MIME body. The body can..."

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§3.3:

>  The
>  Enveloped-Only structure does not support authenticated symmetric
>  algorithms, use the .Authenticated Enveloped structure for these
>  algorithms.

Two nits: "...symmetric algorithms. Use the Authenticated..."
                                  ^        ^
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§6:

>  S/MIME implementations almost universally use ephemeral-static rather
>  than static-static key agreement and do not use a shared secret for
>  encryption, this means that the first precondition is not met.

Nit: "...encryption. This means..."