Re: [lamps] Hybrid pkix isn't needed

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

I gotta say I'm with Watson basically, but open to being
convinced that this stuff is needed nowish rather than being
premature. Thus far, I'm very unconvinced and am also worried
that a lot of the code that'd be needed will be liable to be
buggy and not much exercised, which is a bad combination.

On 30/01/2023 18:30, Mike Ounsworth wrote:
> Especially since the NSA in their CNSA 2.0 have marked code-signing
> as the most urgent use case to migrate to PQC. The idea is that a
> device will leave your manufacturing facility with a burned-in trust
> anchor that it should use for validating future firmware patches. For
> good reason you can't change trust anchors in the field, so we need
> to make sure those algorithms are going to stand the test of time for
> the lifetime of the device.

That's not at all convincing. As stated, we have hash-based
sigs now that don't need any hybrid mechanism.

S.