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Re: [lamps] is the CSRattr ASN.1 broken or not ... Re: New Version Notification for draft-richardson-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs-02.txt

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 05 April 2022 17:39 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>, LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 05 Apr 2022 13:39:28 -0400
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Subject: Re: [lamps] is the CSRattr ASN.1 broken or not ... Re: New Version Notification for draft-richardson-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs-02.txt
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Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
    > I do not understand why my approach leads to a backward compatibility
    > concern.

I'm not sure that your proposal does.
I think that David is just posting a strawman for the case where we think we
can't make it work.

    > Only if the same OID is being used in more than one way by
    > different implementations is there a concern.  If we can list those, we
    > might be able to just document the preferred approach and note the
    > other things that are seen in the wild.

The only question for me is clarifying what it means to request a value.
It sure feels like:

>> -  Requests to use a particular
>>    crypto system (e.g., certification of a public key based on a certain
>>    elliptic curve) are represented as an attribute, to be reflected as
>>    the AlgorithmIdentifier of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo, with a type

is a case where the Registrar/EST-server is telling the client to use a
particular value for the AlgorithmIdentifier.  Yes, that has knock-on effects
in making it pick a particular public key format!

But, it feels the same as the Registrar/EST-server telling the client what
dNSName to put into the SAN.

(Russ: I added you to the invite to the design team meeting tomorrow. Come if
you have time)


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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