Re: [lamps] Spencer Dawkins' No Objection on charter-ietf-lamps-02-00: (with COMMENT)

I am not sure that that is possible.

Signature is easy, just pickle the data and signature in a hash-chain and
you are done.

Problem with confidentiality is it is break once and it fails. All that you
can do by adding technology to a public key encryption system is to provide
additional ways to decrypt. The only way to protect against quantum
cryptanalysis is to only use quantum resistant crypto. We can do that (e.g.
Kerberos) but it ain't easy.

Forward secrecy doesn't provide quantum resistance and it only works at the
message layer, I don't know how to apply forward secrecy to data at rest
(would love to hear suggestions),

What I do to provide protection is a multi-layer encryption stack with
crypto going on at the Transport, Transaction and Data layers. I can't use
forward secrecy above the transaction layer.

On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 3:35 PM, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> wrote:

> On 5/23/18 1:13 PM, Spencer Dawkins wrote:
>
>> 4. Specify the use of a pre-shared key (PSK) along with other key
>> management techniques with supported by the Cryptographic Message
>> Syntax (CMS) as a near-term mechanism to protect present day
>> communication from the future invention of a large-scale quantum
>> computer.
>>
>> I found it confusing because "near-term" isn't "near-term from now", it's
>> "near-term after the invention of quantum computing destroys civilization.
>>
>
> My understanding is that the intention is "near-term from now." The idea
> is that LAMPS should develop something that you could use, say, next year
> to encrypt email you send so that, 15 years from now when someone finally
> builds a 4,000 qubit machine, they can't dig out your (then) 14-year-old
> email and decrypt it.
>
> /a
>
>
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