[lamps] Re: Mike Bishop's No Objection on draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-15: (with COMMENT)

[Mike Bishop <[e-mail]>]

I'm thinking of something like https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-28.html#section-14.8, which says "We take this security precaution, because if we didn't, the following attack would work: ... The attack above is prevented because (thing) leads to detection of the attack." You're wanting to hint at a fallback position, so maybe also "Doing (alternative) would reduce the odds of the attack succeeding, but not eliminate it."

That is, document the reason the requirement is there, discuss the fallback, and why it's helpful but not sufficient. If someone's operational constraints dictate disabling core security features of the protocol, you've explained why that's a bad idea and also discussed how to mitigate the fallout.

Another approach might be to phrase it as uncertainty. It MUST be freshly generated, but if there's concern about potential collisions due to limited sources of randomness, this additional step can mitigate the fallout of a collision; if a "collision" is made more likely by someone's operational setup, you've at least helped.

________________________________
From: Mike Ounsworth <[e-mail]>
Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2026 8:41 PM
To: Mike Bishop <[e-mail]>
Cc: The IESG <[e-mail]>; [e-mail] <[e-mail]>; [e-mail] <[e-mail]>; [e-mail] <[e-mail]>; [e-mail] <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: [lamps] Mike Bishop's No Objection on draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-15: (with COMMENT)

Hi @Mike Bishop

Thanks for the careful review.

I have made these changes here:
https://github.com/lamps-wg/draft-composite-sigs/commit/c2d3ca12014874ab5adbc3a4750ed59e36c54011


I think this COMMENT of yours is really astute and probably actually should be a DISCUSS. So let's discuss ;)


In Section 9.3:

>   designers are aware that some implementers may be forced to break
>   this rule due to operational constraints.  This section documents the
>   implications of doing so.

This statement makes me nervous. Maybe this section should explain why the MUST
exists, and not touch any implied "permission" to violate it?

That section basically says "We are aware that people are going to have to violate the core security requirement of the draft, so let's analyse exactly what happens when you do".
Trust me, it also makes me nervous. Very nervous.
I have a customer in this situation, and trust me, I have tried my hardest to talk them out of it.
The thinking here is that if we can't stop it, then at least we can document what sharp pointy edges you need to watch out for.
Thoughts?

On Wed, 1 Apr 2026 at 09:50, Mike Bishop via Datatracker <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Mike Bishop has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-15: No Objection

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you for this work. This is an important step forward in our handling of
PQ crypto.

Section 3.1.1: There are a lot of MAY-examples in this section, when the whole
thing is an overarching "MAY do whatever internally so long as the external is
consistent." Consider not using MAY for every single example.

----

Section 4 has:

>   example, a stand-alone RSA private key can be encoded in Chinese
>   Remainder Theorem form.  In order to obtain interoperability,

Consider an informative reference?

----

Section 6 has:

>   Labels are represented here as ASCII strings, but implementers MUST
>   convert them to byte strings using the obvious ASCII conversions

While they may be obvious, calling them so comes across a bit oddly. Maybe just
say something like "Labels are represented here as ASCII strips, but are octet
sequences when used in..."

----

Consider moving Section 6.2 to an appendix; it's not part of the core protocol,
just design background.

----

In Section 9.1:

>   algorithm security or to provide migration flexibility.  Let's
>   quickly explore both.

It's typically advised to avoid first- or second-person language in
specifications. I'd just drop this final sentence, personally.

----

In Section 9.3:

>   designers are aware that some implementers may be forced to break
>   this rule due to operational constraints.  This section documents the
>   implications of doing so.

This statement makes me nervous. Maybe this section should explain why the MUST
exists, and not touch any implied "permission" to violate it?

----

In Section 9.4:

>   message which happens to start with this string.  The designers
>   accepted this trade-off.

I would remove this last sentence. You've explained the trade-off; it's up to
the implementers to decide whether it's worth making, no?

----

Consider moving Section 10 to an appendix.



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