Re: [lamps] Call for adoption of draft-becker-guthrie-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-02

["Kampanakis, Panos" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Allie,

Thx. If there is no overlap between the Subject Name or SANs in the two related certs, should they be used at the same time in a PQ transition scenario since the verifier can only be talking to one identity at a time? To rephrase that, if the two related certs include completely different identities, wouldn't that be a problem for the TLS, IKEv2, etc verifier?
- When the verifier is presented with a classical RSA peer cert, it confirms the identity of the cert is the identity it is talking to.
- When the verifier is presented with just one PQ peer related-cert, it will confirm the identity of the cert is the identity it is talking to.
- While still in the PQ transition phase, when the verifier is presented with one classical RSA peer cert and one PQ peer related-cert, what is it supposed to do if the identities in these certs are completely different? Verify only one identity and assume the other one belongs to the same peer because of POP at issuance?


From: Spasm <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of [e-mail]
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2023 12:38 PM
To: Kampanakis, Panos <kpanos=[e-mail]>; Russ Housley <[e-mail]>; LAMPS <[e-mail]>
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL][lamps] Call for adoption of draft-becker-guthrie-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-02


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Hi Panos,
  Thanks for the comments. It is not always the case that SANs will unambiguously identify a certificate, as they are not globally unique. Especially in the case that may arise in which a different CA has issued a related certificate, we want to provide strong assurance that the certificate is under the control of the correct end-entity. Matching names depends on mapping the namespaces of the issuers (which may suffice for discovery); our draft provides the existing (traditional) PoP nested in the new (PQC) PoP, which we think provides more assurance.

Cheers,
Alie

----
________________________________
From: Spasm <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> on behalf of Kampanakis, Panos <kpanos=[e-mail]<mailto:kpanos=[e-mail]>>
Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2023 9:33 PM
To: Russ Housley <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; LAMPS <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [lamps] Call for adoption of draft-becker-guthrie-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-02

My previous objections and concerns have not been addressed, but maybe I had misunderstood the spirit of the draft. So let me repeat the last, most important, question after Mike's presentation of the draft in IETF-115.

It seems that the draft just wants to provide an extension that says cert A and cert B are related and owned by the same entity and allow a CSR to prove that the requester of Cert B also owns the private key for Cert A. In other words the flow would work as:
- Entity X generates a CSR for CertA and proves it owns the private key for A. The issuer generates CertA after verifying the ownership of private key A and the identity of X.
- Entity X generates a CSR for CertB which is related to CertA and proves it owns the private key for A and B. The issuer generates CertB (related-to-CertA) after verifying the ownership of private keys A and B and the identity of X.
- Entity X owns CertA and CertB which it uses to be authenticated in protocol Y. The protocol Y verifier gets CertA and CertB, it verifies the peer owns the private key for CertA, CertB and it confirms it trusts these certs were issued for Entity X.

Now let's forget the draft and say we do not use a new X.509 or CSR extension. And let's say the flow now works as
- Entity X generates a CSR for CertA and proves it owns the private key for A. The issuer generates CertA after verifying the ownership of private key A and the identity of X.
- Entity X generates a CSR for CertB and proves it owns the private key for B. The issuer generates CertB after verifying the ownership of private key B and the identity of X.
- Entity X owns CertA and CertB which it uses to be authenticated in protocol Y. The protocol Y verifier gets CertA and CertB, it verifies the peer owns the private key for CertA, CertB and it confirms it trusts BOTH of these certs were issued for the same entity Entity X.

Why is the former flow better over the latter? In other words, if CertA and CertB were issued separately, why could the verifier not just use the Subject Name or SANs to confirm the certs relationship while verifying?



-----Original Message-----
From: Spasm <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> On Behalf Of Russ Housley
Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2023 6:02 PM
To: LAMPS <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [lamps] Call for adoption of draft-becker-guthrie-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-02

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Do the changes that were made in -02 of the Internet-Draft resolve the concerns that were previously raised?

On behalf of the LAMPS WG Chairs,
Russ


> On Sep 15, 2022, at 11:44 AM, Russ Housley <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>
> There has been some discussion of https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fdraft-becker-guthrie-cert-binding-for-multi-auth%2F&data=05%7C01%7Caebecke%40uwe.nsa.gov%7Cd4dd908b5872439f1f0408daef96c7fd%7Cd61e9a6ffc164f848a3e6eeff33e136b%7C0%7C0%7C638085728259980926%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=nVzReEXbWrb8sHQPdGWv9G95WoP1GiKdjlHZP6DesmA%3D&reserved=0.  During the discussion at IETF 114, we agree to have a call for adoption of this document.
>
> Should the LAMPS WG adopt "Related Certificates for Use in Multiple Authentications within a Protocol" indraft-becker-guthrie-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-01?
>
> Please reply to this message by Friday, 30 September 2022 to voice your support or opposition to adoption.
>
> On behalf of the LAMPS WG Chairs,
> Russ
>

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