Re: [lamps] OID für KEM?

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Sat, 16 October 2021 20:37 UTC

Return-Path: <kaduk@mit.edu>
X-Original-To: spasm@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: spasm@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A22A3A0CAC for <spasm@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 16 Oct 2021 13:37:37 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.499
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.499 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, KHOP_HELO_FCRDNS=0.399, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id eR-7bRrQeQab for <spasm@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 16 Oct 2021 13:37:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 705E33A0CAB for <spasm@ietf.org>; Sat, 16 Oct 2021 13:37:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from kduck.mit.edu ([24.16.140.251]) (authenticated bits=56) (User authenticated as kaduk@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 19GKbOKW013520 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Sat, 16 Oct 2021 16:37:29 -0400
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 2021 13:37:23 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <20211016203723.GM4103@kduck.mit.edu>
References: <5BA17D7A-F19D-474B-8DD8-8EB36A363818@ll.mit.edu> <C7F5365D-3B42-49CF-AA4F-E6974F071422@vigilsec.com> <FBE3CC86-6DEE-4955-9BA8-3FE2DDF35F4E@ll.mit.edu> <8A3163D9-EB86-487E-B0D4-75A39AB44797@vigilsec.com> <20211008171710.GU4103@kduck.mit.edu> <9710DAC4-ABB2-41D7-8F4B-BDC55DE96F62@ll.mit.edu> <24117.1633889437@localhost>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <24117.1633889437@localhost>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/z_XWUCwGOxKkmwGtzDdmczdFGL8>
Subject: Re: [lamps] OID für KEM?
X-BeenThere: spasm@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is a venue for discussion of doing Some Pkix And SMime \(spasm\) work." <spasm.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/spasm>, <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/>
List-Post: <mailto:spasm@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm>, <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 16 Oct 2021 20:37:37 -0000

On Sun, Oct 10, 2021 at 02:10:37PM -0400, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>     > On 10/8/21, 13:17, "Benjamin Kaduk" <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>     > On Fri, Oct 08, 2021 at 01:13:01PM -0400, Russ Housley wrote:
>     >>> .  .  .  .  .  My worry is with the winning algorithms.
>     >>> I worry that implementations will have to support the
>     >>> researcher-assigned OID and the NIST-assigned OID.
>     >>
>     >> Sounds like what happened at https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16594
>     >>
>     >> OpenSSL waited for the final SHA3 to implement, but then
>     >> got asked to also expose pre-standardization Keccak.
>     >> ^^^^
> 
>     > I acknowledge the concern that Russ expressed. But IMHO, it's
>     > inconvenient at worst. I see no reason to bend over backwards trying to
>     > avoid such a situation.
> 
> I also agree that it can be annoying, but I don't think that it's that huge a deal.
> It would be nice if this didn't happen, but it seems to me that integers are
> plentiful, and I think that we gain as a community from understanding how
> things work or didn't work.
> 
> As I understand Ben's comment, the "pre-standization Keccak" (and the
> unmodified Rijndael) are in fact different algorithms.

IIRC (not guaranteed), pre-standardization Keccak and SHA-3 differ in a few
constants, and the mapping between byte string and bit string, and are
definitely different algorithms.

> Ben didn't say what OpenSSL did.

The relevant policy body voted and approved an exception, so OpenSSL now
exposes pre-standardization Keccak as well as SHA-3.

-Ben