Re: [spring] Spring protection - determining applicability

Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net> Mon, 03 August 2020 18:30 UTC

Return-Path: <robert@raszuk.net>
X-Original-To: spring@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: spring@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A41B63A1057 for <spring@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 3 Aug 2020 11:30:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.3
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.3 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, PDS_BTC_ID=0.498, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=raszuk.net
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LHNOh2tBfvz6 for <spring@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 3 Aug 2020 11:30:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ej1-x62a.google.com (mail-ej1-x62a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 45D553A0980 for <spring@ietf.org>; Mon, 3 Aug 2020 11:30:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ej1-x62a.google.com with SMTP id o18so39665534eje.7 for <spring@ietf.org>; Mon, 03 Aug 2020 11:30:37 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=raszuk.net; s=google; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=PMu81VNnlFjbh2DwDWP+DdG5vchyBJdc5iYwk3cR/nI=; b=VjixHb4U/MkCw/KxyF8uA23Ig3pUwwauNGMyUMFBmA1F2KmBsNpbg9oXxBdjoj3hnF AnGH5464cNNhF35l8xaCwcW7Fg/39glmoc1rPhmVf8g9wGgSVaCp+kvsTf/3UfHKzQ5M BFHjL77qRzTMjzYUf5+pbS/aZ13JIGe3WRaTkeFDZzT/HuaJasLk/BtWyYE3S9oc6GnL j/IWoqkiXyhWYPkPXcjnNV3F4xbtZmddqZ7tpyIalEJZB9HSJNRa9pB+Zm/7ZvBNjEbC wSM2toeo1vZhWTTlOEJyqiOMEHyqpODNmADWbqKryABHt0ABhfxBt5qUYqee2/n0wI1q PNjw==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=PMu81VNnlFjbh2DwDWP+DdG5vchyBJdc5iYwk3cR/nI=; b=sGhCp7nr7F20KGCE+ct03k+4iEc/1fzMODpPuWcs2h1FEKHQJiYjG+PnZxCcjuyV4b rtxpkTW260ZsDFTCVIx3O2JOAcHl3SJfA6UDCdrVxBwKyYTwFluEw4hjvZoWb486GwtL MYtbf8pgFD5GzXIRy0figsuoasAJmrRNQB7pthPu4QfeM2uNuGqDJQq2xmm5Kix47OdS X6v99KUQGF04M1z8wjjCguEz1MK9/lsWjJpfR5JZxNTmcovj2RtYZWDz1CuyIxI44ifl woISsU69og80mx3nc0KMWYthQAigtXJV/U+I0lEy5vE97+cfrLWcUCEQO8OJVOrDn1kq LfCw==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533oz+veE85pPAWcv9HaiR7fPlKxVM8q1XXDoZnXVNvh3PXXSvBb FeH83RvR4Fp/JgqGsVjymiuZXysu79+Szmbhobfb/5VO
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwurRJrWiO42YaKBlBsZyHKPnY3VLfC4y3P35a/R2+Mb7ipANFFVPZ8eNHLB5X84RqOA0f1Yzxyl/nlTk+T/mI=
X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:868d:: with SMTP id g13mr17618770ejx.242.1596479435622; Mon, 03 Aug 2020 11:30:35 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <7e29a863-70e9-f0a8-638f-5151348be515@joelhalpern.com> <F73A3CB31E8BE34FA1BBE3C8F0CB2AE297D63B99@dggeml510-mbs.china.huawei.com> <AM0PR03MB4499A048326D9A2E8DA5F46B9D4D0@AM0PR03MB4499.eurprd03.prod.outlook.com> <cce664f5-6f20-36ba-ccea-120266697528@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <cce664f5-6f20-36ba-ccea-120266697528@joelhalpern.com>
From: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2020 20:30:25 +0200
Message-ID: <CAOj+MMHZ5wGAPhAO+yLc+RY9OhRX=LuMQ27QQDJkAjK0YM0HMw@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Cc: Alexander Vainshtein <Alexander.Vainshtein@rbbn.com>, "spring@ietf.org" <spring@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000a6e69805abfd55a3"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spring/74sfKGfd5qVC3lH_SFBkyXON0_g>
Subject: Re: [spring] Spring protection - determining applicability
X-BeenThere: spring@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Source Packet Routing in NetworkinG \(SPRING\)" <spring.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/spring>, <mailto:spring-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spring/>
List-Post: <mailto:spring@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:spring-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spring>, <mailto:spring-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2020 18:30:40 -0000

Joel,

Are we still talking about IP networks here ? Or perhaps some hard slicing
with real resource reservations or detnets ?

Because if we are talking about IP networking I have two observations:

A) If you need to traverse via a specific node (ie. firewall) you better
apply IP encapsulation to that node. I don't think IP encapsulation can be
hijacked today such that destination address of the packet is ignored.

B) Have you seen any IP network where upon topology change (link or node
failure) you suddenly start dropping flows in spite of SPT offering perhaps
few ms longer path with 10 ms more jitter ?

Or are some SR marketing slides promise to turn IP networks in
something new ? Worse ... do they mention path quality guarantees, resource
reservations ? I hope not.

Thx,
R.









On Mon, Aug 3, 2020 at 8:10 PM Joel M. Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com> wrote:

> Well less serious for TE SIDs, I am not sure the problem is restricted
> to just service SIDs.
>
> Suppose that the PCE has specified the path to meet some complex te
> objective.  The bypass node has no way of knowing what those constraints
> were.  And for some kinds of traffic, it is better to drop the packet
> than to deliver it outside the envelop.  I suspect that the right answer
> to this is "too bad".  If so, as with the distinction regarding service
> nodes, we should say so, shouldn't we?
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
> On 8/3/2020 2:36 AM, Alexander Vainshtein wrote:
> > Mach, Joel and all,
> >
> > I think that in most cases:
> >
> > 1.There is clear differentiation between "topological" and "service"
> > instructions in SID advertisements. E.g.:
> >
> > oIGP Prefix Node SIDs IGP Adj-SIDs (identified as such in the
> > corresponding IGP advertisements) represent topological instructions
> >
> > oService SIDs for SRv6 (see SRv6 BGP-Based Overlay Services
> > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bess-srv6-services-04>
>
> > draft) unsurprisingly represent “service” instructions
> >
> > 2.Segments that represent topological instructions can be bypassed,
> > while segments that represent service instructions require alternative
> > protection mechanisms.
> >
> > This view seems to be aligned with RFC 8402
> > <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8402> that says in Section 1:
> >
> >     In the context of an IGP-based distributed control plane, two
> >
> > topological segments are defined: the IGP-Adjacency segment and the
> >
> >     IGP-Prefix segment.
> >
> >     In the context of a BGP-based distributed control plane, two
> >
> > topological segments are defined: the BGP peering segment and the
> >
> >     BGP-Prefix segment.
> >
> > In the case of SR-MPLS this differentiation is assumed in Section 3.4 of
> > the Node Protection for SR-TE Path
> > <
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hegde-spring-node-protection-for-sr-te-paths-07#section-3.4>
>
> > draft that says:
> >
> >     The node protection mechanism described in the previous sections
> >
> >     depends on the assumption that the label immediately below the top
> >
> > label in the label stack is understood in the IGP domain.  When the
> >
> >     provider edge routers exchange service labels via BGP or some other
> >
> >     non-IGP mechanism the bottom label is not understood in the IGP
> >
> >     domain.
> >
> >     The egress node protection mechanisms described in the draft
> >
> >     [RFC8679 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8679>] is
> > applicable to this use case and no additional changes
> >
> >     will be required for SR based networks
> >
> > The scenarios in which  differentiation between “topological” and
> > “service” instructions is broken are indeed problematic. E.g., consider
> > the use case in which a Node SID in the ERO of a SR-TE path identifies a
> > node that acts as a firewall for all packets it receives, i.e., provides
> > the firewall service without any dedicated service SID identifying it.
> > One could say that the Node SID of such a node would combine topological
> > and service instructions thus breaking the differentiation between the
> two.
> >
> > I am not sure if usage of such “combined” SIDs could be prevented or at
> > least discouraged.
> >
> > If not, providing an ability to identify such SIDs in the advertisement
> > mechanisms would be useful IMHO.
> >
> > My 2c,
> >
> > Sasha
> >
> > Office: +972-39266302
> >
> > Cell:      +972-549266302
> >
> > Email:   Alexander.Vainshtein@ecitele.com
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: spring <spring-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Mach Chen
> > Sent: Monday, August 3, 2020 6:30 AM
> > To: Joel M. Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com>om>; spring@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [spring] Spring protection - determining applicability
> >
> > Hi Joel,
> >
> > I think this is a good point that may not be discussed in the past. And
> > I also don't think there is a "can be bypassed" indication in the
> > routing advertisement for now.
> >
> > IMHO, the information advertised by routing is neutral, such information
> > (can or cannot be bypassed) is more path specific, thus normally the
> > controller should be responsible for deciding whether/which SID can be
> > bypassed.
> >
> > Best regards,
> >
> > Mach
> >
> >  > -----Original Message-----
> >
> >  > From: spring [mailto:spring-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Joel M.
> >
> >  > Halpern
> >
> >  > Sent: Monday, August 3, 2020 7:51 AM
> >
> >  > To: spring@ietf.org <mailto:spring@ietf.org>
> >
> >  > Subject: [spring] Spring protection - determining applicability
> >
> >  >
> >
> >  > (WG Chair hat Off, this is merely a note from a slightly confused WG
> >
> >  > participant.)
> >
> >  >
> >
> >  > I have been reading the various repair drafts, and the various
> >
> >  > networks programming and service programming draft, and I am trying to
> >
> >  > figure out one aspect of the combination.
> >
> >  >
> >
> >  > How does a node that is doing some form of bypass (suppose, for
> >
> >  > simplicity, it is Node N2 deciding to bypass the next SID for a failed
> >
> >  > node N3) know that it is safe to do so?
> >
> >  >
> >
> >  > If the path was just for TE, then it is "safe" if the new path meets
> >
> >  > the TE criteria.  or maybe it is safe if it is even close, as long as
> >
> >  > it is not used for too long.
> >
> >  >
> >
> >  > But what if the node were a Firewall, included to meet legal
> > requirements?
> >
> >  > Or was some other necessary programmatic transform (wince we are
> >
> >  > deliberately vague about what nodes can do when asked suitably.)
> >
> >  >
> >
> >  > Is there some "can be bypassed" indication in the routing
> >
> >  > advertisements that I missed?
> >
> >  >
> >
> >  > Thank you,
> >
> >  > Yours,
> >
> >  > Joel
> >
> >  >
> >
> >  > _______________________________________________
> >
> >  > spring mailing list
> >
> >  > spring@ietf.org <mailto:spring@ietf.org>
> >
> >  >
> > https://clicktime.symantec.com/367qhU4KiUkzW9uGC4eAvP46H2?u=https%3A%2
> > <
> https://clicktime.symantec.com/367qhU4KiUkzW9uGC4eAvP46H2?u=https%3A%252>
> >
> >  > F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspring
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> >
> > spring mailing list
> >
> > spring@ietf.org <mailto:spring@ietf.org>
> >
> >
> https://clicktime.symantec.com/367qhU4KiUkzW9uGC4eAvP46H2?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspring
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Notice: This e-mail together with any attachments may contain
> > information of Ribbon Communications Inc. that is confidential and/or
> > proprietary for the sole use of the intended recipient. Any review,
> > disclosure, reliance or distribution by others or forwarding without
> > express permission is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended
> > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and then delete all
> > copies, including any attachments.
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > spring mailing list
> > spring@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spring
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> spring mailing list
> spring@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spring
>