Re: [spring] AD Review of draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-ldp-interop-09
Ahmed Bashandy <abashandy.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 11 May 2018 15:04 UTC
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To: Alvaro Retana <aretana.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: spring@ietf.org, bruno.decraene@orange.com, stephane.litkowski@orange.com, cfilsfil@cisco.com, "draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-ldp-interop@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-ldp-interop@ietf.org>, martin.vigoureux@nokia.com, stefano@previdi.net, spring-chairs@ietf.org
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From: Ahmed Bashandy <abashandy.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 11 May 2018 08:04:45 -0700
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Subject: Re: [spring] AD Review of draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-ldp-interop-09
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Thanks you very much I will take care of the comments below in the next version that I plan to put out in next week Ahmed On 5/10/18 1:41 PM, Alvaro Retana wrote: > On April 11, 2018 at 10:22:46 PM, Ahmed Bashandy > (abashandy.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:abashandy.ietf@gmail.com>) wrote: > > Ahmed: > > Hi! How are you? > > I still have a couple of comments below…but nothing that should hold > up process at this point. I’ll start the IETF Last Call. > > Thanks! > > Alvaro. > > ... >>> M2.1.2. "At least one SRMS MUST be present in the routing domain. >>> Multiple SRMSs SHOULD be present for redundancy.” These MUST|SHOULD >>> seem to indicate a statement of fact. Again, from a specification >>> point of view, what can be enforced? s/MUST|SHOULD/must|should. >>> Note also that in 7.2 the text says that "Multiple SRMSs can be >>> provisioned in a network for redundancy.”, which seems to be the >>> right thing (no Normative language). >> #Ahmed >> I removed these two statements. Instead I modified the 3rd paragraph >> in Section 4.2 to indicate that there must be at least one SRMS >> server in the domain > > The modification of that 3rd paragraph now reads: "At least one SRMS > server MUST exist in a routing domain…”, which really just moved the > issue I was pointing to from 4.2.1 to 4.2. As I asked before, how can > that “MUST” be enforced? > > Note that the sentence following this new text says: "Multiple SRMSs > may be present in the same network (for redundancy).” I think that’s > the right way to express what is needed (no Normative language). > > >>> M2.2. Section 7.2. says that "a preference mechanism may also be >>> used among SRMSs so to deploy a primary/secondary SRMS scheme”…but >>> no other details are included. This document is where the SRMS is >>> first defined, so I would expect this detail to also be included >>> here. I note that Section 3.1. (SID Preference) >>> of draft-ietf-spring-conflict-resolution contains the preference >>> specification. Please move that section to this document. >> Ahmed: agreed. But since section 7.2 is under the manageability >> consideration, IMO it should really not contain much specification. >> Instead, I modified section 4.2.2 specify how to prefer SRMS >> advertisements and removed section 7.2 completely. Section 7.2 in >> version 11 is section 7.3 in version 10 > > Ok. > > I see that some of the text came from §3.1 in > draft-ietf-spring-conflict-resolution, but not all of that section > made it — specifically the part about the implicit preference values. > Why? > > I didn’t check, but I’m assuming that the text that was moved here is > not also in draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-mpls. Is that true? > > > ... > >>> M4. Security Considerations. I tend to agree that this document >>> doesn’t introduce anything new…but it does specify something >>> different. The base SR-related advertisement by an IGP is done for >>> the segments belonging to the local node, but the SRMS lets a node >>> (any node, multiple nodes) adverse any mapping (for nodes that may >>> be anywhere in the network) which may result in conflicting >>> advertisements (in the best case), or even false ones. >>> Cryptographic authentication (any any other current security >>> mechanisms in IGPs) only verify that the information was not >>> changed, but it doesn’t validate the information itself, which can >>> then lead to conflicting and or false advertisements, which could >>> “compromise traffic forwarding”. You should at least recognize that >>> the risk exists, even if no specific mitigation (except maybe strict >>> configuration/programmability control by the operator) can be mentioned. >> #Ahmed: Agreed. Added text to indicate what you mentioned > > Thanks for adding some text…but I think you should still say more. > The risk is of course that a rogue router can inject any mapping it > wants: logging, control, etc..help avoid mistakes, but it doesn’t help > in the case where the incorrect/false mapping is advertised on > purpose. This last case is something I would like to see mentioned > explicitly. > > > ... > >>> P2. Please add References for "RSVP-TE, BGP 3107, VPNv4”. BTW, >>> note that rfc3107 has been obsoleted by rfc8277 — you make >>> references to “BGP3107” routes/label. >> #Ahmed Removed VPNv4 and added references to the others > > I think that by "BGP [RFC8277]” you really didn’t meant just “BGP”, > but “BGP and Labeled Address Prefixes” (or something like that). > > There are still 4 occurrences of “BGP3107". >
- [spring] AD Review of draft-ietf-spring-segment-r… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [spring] AD Review of draft-ietf-spring-segme… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [spring] AD Review of draft-ietf-spring-segme… Ahmed Bashandy
- Re: [spring] AD Review of draft-ietf-spring-segme… Ahmed Bashandy
- Re: [spring] AD Review of draft-ietf-spring-segme… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [spring] AD Review of draft-ietf-spring-segme… Ahmed Bashandy